CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 26 March 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdelhamid Semichi (Algeria)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 619th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I am particularly happy to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to His Excellency the President of the Swiss Confederation and Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. René Felber. The visit by His Excellency Mr. Felber is certainly appreciated by all of us, as he is a distinguished figure whose outstanding political career began in Neuchâtel, where he presided over the State Council in 1984. In his capacity as National Councillor, he was a member of the commissions on foreign trade and on foreign affairs, and since he joined the Federal Council on 1 January 1988, he has been Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. On 4 December 1991 His Excellency Mr. René Felber was elected President of the Confederation for the current year. I would like to emphasize the important contribution made by Switzerland to our work and its interest in all questions relating to disarmament. The presence of the President of the Swiss Confederation today in our midst is a further testimony to this. I would also like to underscore the active role that has been played by His Excellency Mr. René Felber at the Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and especially his dedication to multilateral diplomacy. He is well known to us all here in the United Nations Office at Geneva, where I have the pleasure of welcoming him today. I would like to thank him for coming to our meeting, and I am sure that all members of the Conference will follow his statement with particular attention.

On the list of speakers today, besides His Excellency the President of the Swiss Confederation and Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. René Felber, are the representatives of the United Kingdom, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Canada, Bulgaria and Venezuela. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to His Excellency the President of the Swiss Confederation and Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Mr. René Felber.

Mr. FELBER (Switzerland) (translated from French): Mr. President, I was most touched by the kind words you have just addressed to me, and in my turn I would like to congratulate you most sincerely on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced that thanks to your well-tried abilities you will be able to conduct the difficult task which falls to you at a time when the work of your Conference has entered a crucial phase. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Berasategui, a man of experience, who has taken over from Ambassador Komatina as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I would also like to express my pleasure at meeting in his new duties officially Mr. Antoine Blanca, the new Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva.

I am happy to be with you today for a few moments. Your commitment to the cause of disarmament is well known and my Government is pleased to see that the new spirit of cooperation in international relations has spread to your work as well. The important successes achieved in the last few years,

(Mr. Felber, Switzerland)

such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the START Agreement and the announcement by the United States and the Russian Federation of unilateral reductions and plans for future negotiations also, I am sure, give new impetus to your work. Allow me also to welcome other initiatives, such as those taken by several countries in Latin America to ban weapons of mass destruction from their region and to cut back conventional arms. They prove that cooperation in security matters is not limited only to the former antagonists in the cold war. My country, which has always worked for the peaceful settlement of disputes, also welcomes with relief the beginnings of the peace processes in the Middle East, Cambodia, Yugoslavia and other regions which are unfortunately still experiencing conflicts. I wish to remind you of our resolve to contribute to peace-keeping operations.

The end of the cold war and progress in peace have unfortunately not eliminated all sources of instability, nor all potential for conflict. We are living in a world which remains complex and faced with a host of threats. The risks engendered by the spread of weapons of mass destruction are not the least among them. More than ever, my country is concerned about nuclear proliferation. The example of Iraq and the disturbing rumours concerning illegal sales of nuclear materials show just how real the danger is. My Government is ready, in agreement with other States, to make an active contribution to efforts undertaken in order to put an end to the brain drain from the former Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the main pillar of the present non-proliferation system. We welcome the fact that a number of States - including nuclear Powers - have recently acceded to it or have announced their intention to do so in the near future. The NPT has thus become an almost universal instrument, which seems to us to auger well for its future. This universality, as well as the achievement of new advances in the field of the reduction of nuclear weapons over the last three years or the three years to come, should, we feel, make it easier to extend the Treaty substantially beyond 1995. However, the case of Iraq has highlighted the urgent need for a review of the procedures attached to the safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the NPT, in order to restore their credibility. My country possesses no chemical weapons, nor any other weapons of mass destruction, and has no intention of acquiring such weapons. My Government is impatiently awaiting the rapid conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. It is true that the problem of verification is a difficult one, and for my part I would not wish to play down its complexity. I am, however, aware that thanks to your tenacious efforts all the elements of the problem have been clearly identified. The compromise which you are now elaborating will certainly have a great impact on verification of future disarmament agreements. My Government attaches very special importance to this aspect. The present trend rightly favours the strengthening of challenge inspections. It would therefore be desirable for us to be able to draw on the precedent supplied by the chemical weapons convention for this sort of inspection in future treaties. As for verification in industrial facilities, we organized a symposium at the end of January in Basel, which I hope was useful. The chemical industry in my country, of whose importance you are aware, realizes that verification is necessary. It has reason to believe that a strengthening of confidence will certainly have beneficial impacts on its own activities and on freedom of

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trade. Routine inspections will have a place in the convention. Here too we are expecting you to come up with innovative solutions. Too costly a system, entailing a massive bureaucracy, which moreover would not be totally reliable, is in nobody's interest. So I would encourage you to look for simple solutions combining flexibility with maximum deterrence.

A week ago my Austrialian colleague preceded me as a speaker on this podium. His very important statement, I believe, is a valuable contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I know that the members of the Committee, under the expert guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador von Wagner, are sparing no effort to iron out the final difficulties.

Allow me here to express my Government's gratitude for your work. Switzerland long ago abandoned any policy based on power, and its military resources are solely intended to defend the country. That is why disarmament, provided it is balanced and verifiable, has always enjoyed our support. With the same consistency, we have never abandoned our commitment to international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. More than a century ago, in this city, eminent citizens brought humanitarian law into the world. Sixty years ago, these very premises hosted the great disarmament conference in which Switzerland, like many of your countries, participated with the hope that appeared to be founded on reason - the hope of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately our faith soon turned into dark bitterness. For several years now we have been following the work of your Conference very closely. Although we were unable to take part in the negotiations, we have ratified all the agreements that have emerged from your Conference. The gradual improvement in the status of observers has allowed us to make more concrete contributions. We were thus able to make use of the experience acquired by our military laboratory in Spiez and the expertise available in our chemical industry.

The concern for effectiveness, and the history of the Conference too, explain why there are currently only a limited number of member States in this body. However, we believe that, since a new international security system is emerging and since the United Nations is now making efforts to establish a register on arms transfers - in which Switzerland will participate - the question of the composition of the Conference on Disarmament and its agenda ought to be raised again. You will undoubtedly recall that my country has applied to become a full member. Today it is no longer possible to consider that disarmament is something to be dealt with between blocs, since the blocs have disappeared. Since all States are concerned, each one should have the opportunity to express its views and participate on an equal footing. Hence it seems to me inevitable that after the chemical weapons convention is concluded, the future role of the Conference on Disarmament should be the subject of in-depth discussion with all interested States.

All this will make clear to you my country's wish to be more closely involved in worldwide disarmament efforts. At the same time I would like to assure you that we wish to maintain our traditional policy of hosting organizations and international conferences. In so doing, we also intend to

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support negotiating processes as much as we possibly can. We are proud of this tradition. We wish to maintain it and to ensure that such meetings and conferences can take place smoothly and that diplomats and experts enjoy the best possible conditions to carry out their tasks. On the basis of this traditional openness, Switzerland has put forward Geneva as a candidate for the headquarters of the future organization for chemical weapons control. We would be pleased to host that institution here. It would be offered the same conditions we have given to the other organizations which have successively established themselves in Geneva. Given the special importance which my country attaches to the elimination of chemical weapons throughout the world once and for all, the Swiss Government would be prepared to make a special contribution of 2.5 million francs to the preparatory commission towards financing infrastructure costs in Geneva during the transitory phase. Furthermore, my country would be prepared to commit an equivalent amount for the training of inspectors for the future organization. A training programme could be drawn up by the AC laboratory in Spiez, which, because of its experience, has been entrusted with various expert missions, notably in the context of Security Council resolution 687. The Swiss Chemical industry would also be prepared to cooperate in this programme, in order to allow trainee inspectors to become familiar with the verification of industrial facilities. If our offer meets with your approval, its implementation will of course be carried out in close cooperation with the prepratory commission. In offering this training programme, Switzerland wishes to underscore the importance it attaches to verification. We believe that it is through verification that an effective contribution can be made to the establishment of trust, which is so important for maintaining peace in international relations. My country knows that trust is not a gift in itself but that, on the contrary, it has to be gained and kept. It is this trust that will allow us, in the final analysis, to dedicate our efforts and resources to a greater extent to the progress and well-being of our peoples.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the President of the Swiss Confederation and head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for his important statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I shall now suspend the plenary meeting in order to accompany His Excellency Mr. René Felber and take leave of him. I invite you to stay in the Council chamber as we will resume our meeting in five minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 10.30 a.m. and resumed at 10.40 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We shall now resume the work of the 619th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. We shall now listen to the other speakers on the list. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): May I first welcome the important statement we have just heard from His Excellency the President of the Swiss Confederation? It was an honour and a pleasure to have him with us as President of the country host to this Conference and also a very active contributor to our work.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

It was four and a half years ago that I first spoke in this Conference. And today alas this is my last statement. As is the custom among us on such occasions I am speaking on a purely personal basis.

We are all keenly aware of the dramatic changes which have taken place during the past four and a half years in the political and strategic international context in which this Conference works. The long-standing East/West confrontation has gone and the massive arms build-up in Europe is rapidly being dismantled. But problems remain, all too many. What now faces the international community is a fragmented dispersal of political tensions and military power, to be found to varying degrees within almost every continent.

Logic would suggest that in this multi-polar world global arms control and disarmament would have a still greater contribution to make. And I believe this to be the case. East/West confrontation called for East/West solutions: fragmented risks lend themselves more to global action. In the changed circumstances, non-proliferation of armaments has become as much a matter of international concern as arms reductions. And it is above all in non-proliferation that global measures can make a real impact. Faced with these new opportunities what should be the priorities of the Conference on Disarmament?

The top priority is obvious: to complete the negotiations for a chemical weapons convention as quickly as possible. I personally came to the Conference with this aim - a ban, a total ban, on chemical weapons, as my main goal and one close to my own heart. I am sorry to leave the Conference before this goal has been achieved. But at least last Thursday we may have seen the beginning of the breakthrough we have all been waiting for for so long. The initiative of the Australian Foreign Minister and the very positive reception to it by so many delegates gives me much hope. I am confident the convention will happen this year. The negotiations only need a final big push and we are there. I cannot believe this Conference will fail to seize such a wide open opportunity.

There are two aspects of the chemical weapons negotiations which need to be solved quickly. The first is verification, and I shall return to that in a few minutes. The second is destruction. A credible programme to destroy existing chemical weapons within a limited time-frame is one of the most important features of the convention. It is a vital element for the national security of each State party. Unfortunately it has become clear that serious problems remain for a major chemical weapons possessor. These problems will have to be resolved in the next very few months, if a convention is to be concluded this year. A first step in that direction has been taken in putting the issue squarely on the table. A full solution is now a matter of urgency.

Before I turn to the other major outstanding issue, verification, I should like to mention a question which normally only emerges in the technical side of the negotiations. I am referring to the use of experiments on animals as part of the implementation of the convention. At one stage of the negotiations it seemed that successful implementation might require large

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numbers of experiments on animals. Happily the situation has improved. The present structure of the chemical schedules shows that toxicity no longer bears directly upon the verification regime to which individual chemicals will be subject. To the extent that toxicity might be included in guidelines for risk appraisal in routine inspections, precise toxicity measurement will not be important. When the convention enters into force the schedules will be in place, and toxicity levels of the scheduled chemicals are in very many cases already common knowledge. Further determination is unlikely to be required exclusively for the purpose of the convention. Even in the case of new substances proposed for inclusion it is likely that they will be appraised on the basis of toxicity data submitted by the proposing State.

If there are cases - and it seems they should be few, if any - when the convention's technical secretariat or an individual State party considers it essential to undertake toxicity determinations for the purpose of the convention, I think there is widespread agreement that this should whenever possible be conducted through non-animal alternative methods such as cell culture or organ culture; and if this is not practical, with the least number of animals compatible with demonstrating the toxic features of a substance - but I would hope the use of animals would rarely or never have to be resorted to. I suggest that this minimalistic approach be recommended to the preparatory committee and technical secretariat of the convention.

I would argue that the most important conceptual advance in arms control and disarmament in recent times has been the recognition of the vital role of verification. Important advances have been made on a regional and bilateral basis - in the case of Europe through the CSCE process and East/West arms agreements - most recently the "open skies" agreement, which allows States parties to conduct aerial surveillance over each other's territory. But much has been achieved also at the global level. An early breakthrough came with the establishment of the safeguards system of IAEA. The United Nations Secretary-General's powers of investigation of use of chemical and biological weapons broke further ground. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq has taken verification on behalf of the world community to a new dimension of intrusiveness and effectiveness. Agreement has been reached recently in IAEA on strengthening the implementation of its safeguard arrangements by encouraging the Director General to use his powers of challenge inspection in certain categories of undeclared facilities. Work is underway which I hope will give the biological weapons Convention the verification provisions it badly lacks, technically difficult though this will be. It is a story of incremental progress, of a growing acceptance that verification to be effective has to be rigorous and intrusive.

The negotiations for a chemical weapons convention are part of that incremental process. The most rewarding aspect of my own work in the Conference on Disarmament has been the search for a strong system of verification for the convention, in particular through challenge inspection. My authorities, after a dozen or so practical trials, concluded that there was no site so sensitive that we could not allow some form of access within it and that it was possible to reconcile the degree of intrusiveness necessary for effective verification with the protection of legitimate security interests.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

We have had to recognize that not all our negotiating partners could at this stage accept as open a regime as we favoured. I cannot hide my personal disappointment that this is so. Nevertheless the prospects are good for consensus on verification procedures more extensive than in any other global agreement, procedures which will give the convention a significant degree of deterrence against violation, even if not all I and many others had hoped for.

Nor will that be the end of the story. Verification and monitoring are one of the most promising growth areas in global disarmament. I believe the hard decisions will increasingly be taken in the years ahead to give international verification the teeth needed if it is to bite.

Attitudes are changing. At the most recent General Assembly a step was taken which had proved impossible at earlier attempts, namely the establishment by the United Nations of a register of arms transfers. In many parts of the world the dividing line is not easy to identify between a level of armaments sufficient to enable a State to defend itself against threats to its security and the excessive levels which become a threat to the security of neighbouring States. In making such judgements the world community needs a basis of accurate and reliable information. In the aftermath of the Gulf war the British Prime Minister, Mr. Major, and others proposed that, as a first step towards providing such accurate and reliable information, the United Nations should operate a register of transfers between States of the most destabilizing types of armaments. This proposal met with a very high degree of support in the General Assembly: the register has been established and is now open for data from Governments.

In setting up the register the General Assembly called for consideration of further practical measures to increase transparency in armaments. The Conference on Disarmament has been asked to make its contribution. With its unparalleled experience of global disarmament and arms control this Conference should be able to provide a major input. Unfortunately it is still unclear whether the Conference will be able to seize this opportunity. Caution is right. But it would be wrong to let our response be dictated by fear of what is new.

The Conference has to adapt to the changing circumstances of the world which it exists to serve. Imagination and flexibility are needed, and even a dash of daring would not be out of place. Once the chemical weapons convention has been concluded, the time will have come to make a thorough reappraisal of the agenda of the Conference, to ask whether the Conference has a worthwhile role as the world moves into the twenty-first century and if so what that role is.

Perhaps surprisingly part of the answer can be found in a list dating back to 1979, namely the "decalogue" of issues inspired by the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Nuclear weapons in all aspects; chemical weapons; other weapons of mass destruction; conventional weapons; reduction of military budgets; reduction of armed forces; collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective

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verification methods - these figured largely in the minds of our predecessors in 1979: they would not make a bad beginning for a new agenda for the future work of the Conference.

Looking forward over the next few years, I would expect the Conference work to widen its focus from weapons of mass destruction to other weaponry, and from disarmament and bans to a wide range of non-proliferation issues. I would see its role changing from negotiating large-scale agreements, of which perhaps the chemical weapons convention might prove the last, to negotiating agreements of narrower scope and maybe in some cases of a less binding character - guidelines, declarations. And more flexibility might be introduced in the Conference's agenda, so that work might rotate between items, depending on prospects of progress.

The future of the Conference will need to be examined together with that of other global disarmament organs, the First Committee and United Nations Disarmament Commission in particular. Will the UNDC still be required, if some of its functions are absorbed within a changed role for the Conference on Disarmament?

There are many questions. One thing is certain, that our Conference needs to change and adapt if it is not to atrophy.

I have found the last four and a half years here in the Conference on Disarmament sometimes frustrating, sometimes infuriating, but always challenging and worthwhile. I think we have made progress together over that time. I am sure you will do even better in the very near future.

I would like to thank all my colleagues in delegations and in the secretariat for all your help and for your companionship. It has been a privilege for me to work with you, and great fun too.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): It is not without emotion that we have just heard the important statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom. Ambassador Solesby has played a particularly important role in the work of our Conference. She was its President last year, as well as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons during its 1988 session. Ambassador Solesby has carried out her duties with objectivity and distinction. I would like to stress that her competence, her knowledge of the complex problems of disarmament and her intelligence have enabled us to appreciate her as a distinguished participant, always equal to the delicate situations that can arise in our work. Surely and certainly we are all going to miss her. I wish her every success in her future activities, and I hope that she will continue to follow our activities, to which she has made such a major contribution. I wish you good luck, Madam.

I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Donowaki.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): Mr. President, I wish to begin my statement by expressing my delegation's delight at seeing you presiding over the proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament at this critical time in its work. My delegation is confident that, under your competent and skilful guidance, we shall not fail to make meaningful progress in carrying out important tasks entrusted to us. My delegation also wishes to express its appreciation to the two preceding Presidents, Ambassador Calovski of Yugoslavia and Ambassador Mutuale Kikanke of Zaire, for their valuable efforts in organizing the work of the Conference at the beginning of this year's sessions. Furthermore, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the presence this morning of His Excellency Mr. René Felber, President of the Swiss Confederation, and his important statement, to which I listened with great interest.

There is no doubt that the most important task entrusted to us this year is the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Indeed, most of us here felt much obliged to the brave initiative taken by President Bush of the United States last May, because it enabled us to resolve some of the long-standing political issues of our negotiations. Thereafter, the question of challenge inspection became our major focus of attention. It soon became an open secret that even among some of the Western group of nations there existed strong reservations as to the wisdom of tabling a proposal that contained a somewhat less intrusive regime of challenge inspection. However, together with the United States, my country, the United Kingdom and Australia decided to go ahead with the tabling of a draft proposal out of our sincere desire to expedite the negotiations rather than keep other delegations waiting any longer.

Fortunately, our previous Chairman of the CW Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Batsanov of the Russian Federation, wasted no time in making the best of the situation. He took on the enormously difficult task of pushing ahead the negotiations utilizing the four-nation proposal together with other material contained in the "rolling text". Thanks to his untiring efforts, we were able to complete one round of deliberations on the full extent of a possible regime of challenge inspection.

My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express its sincere congratulations to our Chairman of the CW Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador von Wagner, for assuming the very important task of completing the negotiations this year. Also, my delegation shares with him the view that our common goal should be attainable, although he may complain at this stage that he does not see what he hears.

As we are all aware, our Chairman could start this year's work with the least of delays, proving that he has behind him blessings from all of us. Furthermore, the appointment of his bureau members, again with the blessing of all of us, proved to be so well considered that the Working Group Chairman, Mr. Morris of Australia, and the other Friends of the Chair are already making all-out efforts in clearing up remaining issues of our negotiations.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Of course, it is only natural that our Chairman took upon himself the most difficult task of leading us out of the impasse on the question of challenge inspection. My delegation was fully in support of his efforts to find room for any possible trade-offs within the text of the paragraphs of article IX, putting aside for the moment provisions of the protocol on inspection. His energetic and well-intended attempt came close to success but for the last-minute, understandable reservations made by a few of our colleagues. I should like to state that this was a worthwhile exercise, because in this way we were able to ascertain more clearly where the problem areas lay, preparing ourselves for the final wrapping-up stage of our negotations.

The latest and most important contribution in expediting our negotiations came, as we all know, from Australia. The draft text of the convention tabled by the Honourable Senator Evans is, although mostly based on our "rolling text", a product of intensive preparation and consultation. Australia is known for its long-standing commitment and the active roles it played in promoting the cause of prohibiting chemical weapons. As Ambassador O'Sullivan advocated in his plenary statement one year ago, the new text tabled is free from all the brackets and footnotes, which is a great advantage because we know that even a single debracketing, out of hundreds existing in the "rolling text", sometimes requires hours of discussions. We are no longer allowed to indulge in such a luxury. Of course, the Australian draft contains some useful suggestions on some of the unsettled problems, as well as on some aspects of textual arrangements. Also, the draft text will have to be updated in order to reflect the latest progress made in our negotiations. The visit of Senator Evans was like the encounter of our planet called the CD with a powerful meteor called Evans. We were all reminded that our days were numbered unless we came to ourselves. My delegation strongly wishes that our Chairman, Ambassador von Wagner will undertake the task of expediting our negotiations making full use of the valuable Australian contribution.

Apart from the question of challenge inspection, I should like to say a few words on another knotty remaining issue in the chemical weapons negotiations, namely the question of old and abandoned chemical weapons. My delegation is of the view that there must be a way to formulate appropriate language in the convention that would be satisfactory to all the parties concerned in the negotiations, while at the same time ensuring complete destruction of such weapons. My delegation will spare no effort in cooperating with the Friend of the Chair, Ambassador Brotodiningrat, and with all other delegations in finding a solution in such a way.

As for the question of the future seat of the organization, it is my delegation's pleasure to announce, at this juncture, perhaps ahead of some of our colleagues, that my Government has come to the conclusion that The Hague should serve as the ideal site of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation will cooperate with Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, the Friend of the Chair on this question, from this standpoint.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Now, I wish to turn to the question of a nuclear test ban briefly. I am not speaking on behalf of the group of some Western States as their coordinator on the subject item, but in a national capacity, since my Government has traditionally attached special importance to this issue. Japan has over the years been working for the early realization of a nuclear test ban, and continues to regret the fact that underground nuclear testing, although decreasing in frequency in the last few years, is still being carried out by nuclear-weapon States.

Therefore, Japan was greatly encouraged by the re-establishment of the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee in the CD two years ago, and to see that its substantive work was continued last year also under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha and Ambassador Shah of India.

As I have stated on many occasions, the issue of a nuclear test ban has over the years turned into a highly emotional political issue. The nuclear arms race during the peak years of the cold war had the effect of horrifying the world with the prospect of a nuclear holocaust. Nobody could stop the dangerous arms race. If so, couldn't the nuclear-weapon States at least commit themselves to a nuclear test ban? The nuclear arms race would become impossible then, and nuclear disarmament possible. In this way, the nuclear test ban issue came to acquire a highly political and symbolic character. Confrontation istead of dialogue became a normal phenomenon whenever the issue came up for debate.

One of the healthy effects of the ending of the cold war may be the possibility to look at the issue of a nuclear test ban in its proper perspectives. The discussions that took place in the PTBT Amendment Conference already indicated such a new trend. The deliberations on the issue in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee last year, in which my delegation participated actively, proved that dialogue, instead of confrontation, was both possible and meaningful. We were able to listen to detailed reasoning as to why nuclear testing had to be continued as long as there remained a need to rely on nuclear deterrence, even though its priority might have gone down. If that was the case, could a step-by-step approach offer a solution? Similarly, in view of the growing concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, could a regime of a nuclear test ban be established with a sufficiently reliable mechanism of verification and compliance? These are precisely the questions that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue to deal with.

My delegation is convinced that the CD is the only appropriate place where the issue of a nuclear test ban should be addressed, since we have the presence of all five nuclear-weapon States and since the CD is the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. It was for this reason that my delegation was much concerned about the delay in the re-establishment of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee this year. Fortunately, as a result of several presidential consultations and several meetings among item coordinators on the subject, agreement on the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee now appears to be near at hand, and let us hope that the CD will not fail to fulfil its responsibilities on this subject either. Departing from the prepared text, I should like to say that until the end of this session tomorrow, I myself will

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cooperate with you, Mr. President, with the Special Coordinator on this subject item, Ambassador Shah of India, and with all my colleagues to do our best to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee as soon as possible.

It would be remiss of my delegation if no mention was made of the subject of transparency in armaments. Preparations and efforts of a vast number of countries, including my own, went into the adoption last year by the General Assembly of its resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which is expected to start with data on international transfers of conventional arms, but to be expanded to include military holdings and procurement and even more, is a unique multilateral attempt of historic importance in promoting the cause of arms control and disarmament. Naturally, the Register will have to be worked out in such a way that it will serve as a useful confidence-building measure for the security of all nations. This is why several procedures for the elaboration, adjustment, review and expansion of the Register are provided for in the United Nations resolution. A United Nations panel of governmental technical experts is already in place. In addition, the CD is requested to lend its assistance in establishing the Register as a meaningful mechanism in promoting arms control and disarmament. My delegation hopes that the CD will not fail to meet the expectations of the world on this subject either.

It is with a deep sentimental attachment to the Conference on Disarmament and to all my colleagues around the table that I have to leave Geneva for another assignment. At the same time, I can assure you and my colleagues that my successor, Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, is a fine and highly qualified diplomat the Japanese Foreign Ministry is proud to have.

When I arrived here two and a half years ago, my seat was the fourth from the far left of the left table. Now I find myself seated, although by coincidence, in the middle of the middle table, right across from you, Mr. President, which makes me feel somewhat flattered. The greatest event that took place during my rather short stay here in Geneva was the sweeping change in the outlook of the world. However, I am confident that this change will work in our favour, for the greater expectation and responsibility in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This is because we are now moving away from the era of the past United States-Soviet and Eurocentric disarmament into an era of the globalization of disarmament, as was ably described by our previous Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, in his farewell speech a month ago.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union had the effect of deepening our concerns about the problem of proliferation of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. This is why Ambassador Marin Bosch's initiative to hold informal discussions on this subject deserves appreciation. Even our work for the conclusion of the CW convention is nothing other than a testimony to the new era of the globalization of disarmament. The Mendoza Agreement and the Cartagena Declaration are other good examples of the new era. The same may be said of the problem of the United Nations Register and the issue of transparency in armaments. Today, arms control and disarmament problems have to be tackled globally by all nations, rather than, as was the case until

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recently, by super-Powers only or in the European continent only. Whether the Conference on Disarmament will be able to adapt itself to the new era, and seize its opportunities, will depend on whether, after the conclusion of the CW convention, a new thinking on the questions of our agenda items, our way of functioning and so forth will be allowed to prevail among us, and I am confident that it will.

Mr. President,

Lastly, may I convey to you again my best wishes for success in your work? Also, I wish to express my special appreciation to our Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, for his unfailing good counsel and support to my delegation and to the CD. It is an honour and priviledge for me that I leave in the same month as he assumed his important functions. My appreciation also goes to all my colleagues in the Conference as well as to all the colleagues from observer States for their warm friendship, understanding and support extended to me and to my delegation. Lastly, I wish to express my appreciation to all the staff members of the secretariat, including interpreters and clerks, for making my tour of duty here a very pleasant and rewarding one.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Donowaki of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Ambassador Donowaki is also going to leave us in the next few days. He has made a valuable contribution to the work of the Conference, with his tact as an experienced diplomat, his kindness and his competence as an intelligent and particularly effective negotiator. I wish to underscore the decisive role played by Ambassador Donowaki in the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban in 1990, and also the role he played when he served as Chairman of that subsidiary body. This year too, Ambassador Donowaki has offered his efforts and made himself available in order that we might reach agreement on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, which I hope will be settled in the very near future. I wish Ambassador Donowaki and Mrs. Lily Donowaki much happiness, and we are sure that in his new functions Ambassador Donowaki will continue to exercise his diplomatic skills with the personal qualities that we all appreciate in the service of his country, Japan. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Soo Gil Park.

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as this is the first time that I take the floor in this session, I would like to begin by congratulating you on presiding over the Conference on Disarmament, the world's single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and assure you of my delegation's full support for your efforts to discharge your important responsibilities, in particular in achieving substantial progress toward conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. I am certain that this session will benefit greatly from your eminent leadership. I am pleased to take this occasion to express the high admiration of this delegation for the inspiring speech made by the President of the Swiss Confederation and Chief of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency René Felber, this morning. I am also taking this opportunity to express to the new Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui from Argentina, the most heartfelt congratulations on

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his appointment, and best wishes for every success in the fulfilment of his important responsibilities. This morning I learned that two distinguished ambassadors are scheduled to take leave of Geneva soon. I therefore take this occasion to express my admiration for the outstanding contribution Ambassador Donowaki and Ambassador Solesby made to the work of the Conference on Disarmament in their respective capacities as representatives of Japan and the United Kingdom respectively.

As a result of far-reaching global changes, the bipolar system came to an end. During the years of the cold war and of ideological confrontation, the principle of strategic parity was upheld as inviolable. Both sides were watching each other closely to prevent the other from assuming any lead in the arms race. Disarmament was highlighted by talks between the two super-Powers, the former USSR and the United States of America. The end of the cold war, however, has opened up an unprecedented opportunity for the world community to seek a new system of international relations in which the costly burden of arms accumulation is replaced by efforts to ensure the security of all nations at substantially reduced armament levels. During the past several years, in particular, we saw a number of significant disarmament agreements signed, including INF, CFE and START, and certain unilateral nuclear arms reduction measures were also announced.

It is true that the cold war confrontation has now become a thing of the past, but mountains of weapons of mass destruction, huge armies and defence-related industries still remain to be destroyed or converted. In this regard, the Republic of Korea has always been convinced of the necessity of drastically reducing nuclear arsenals well beyond the limitations spelled out in the START Treaty and, therefore, the Republic of Korea welcomes the bold initiatives taken by President George Bush of the United States of America on 28 January 1992, and by President Boris N. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation on 29 January 1992, respectively. They propose radical cuts in the nuclear arsenals, and the strengthening of measures to stabilize relations between their countries. My Government believes that these initiatives are based on their sincere quest for peace and a new world order. In this context, my delegation also welcomes the formation of an international research centre in Russia by the United States, Russia and Germany to coordinate research in various fields, such as nuclear power plant safety, the elimination or alternative use of weapons of mass destruction, the safe burial of nuclear wastes, etc.

No one can deny that the present world situation is full of uncertainties which make it difficult for States to assess their legitimate security needs. The Republic of Korea supports the idea that a major stabilizing factor in this uncertain world is openness and transparency in matters relating to military security, since the absence of openness and transparency could lead to misconceptions and miscalculations, and thereby to tension between neighbouring States.

It is an innovative development in the field of global confidence and security-building that a universal and non-discriminatory arms register has been set up in the United Nations. We believe that this measure would enable

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United Nations Members to plan their security requirements on the basis of better information, thus reducing the scope for misunderstandings. In this regard, it is remarkable that the General Assembly last year adopted a resolution by an overwhelming majority calling upon all Member States to provide information annually for the register of arms transfers. It is noteworthy that the presidential statement of 31 January 1992, at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council at the level of heads of State and government, stressed the need for United Nations Member States to carry out the resolution.

The Conference on Disarmament has been assigned the important role of discussing and elaborating measures to ensure transparency in armaments. As a confidence-building and security-building measure of global dimension, transparency is believed to stand on its own as a new building block for arms control and disarmament. The Republic of Korea is firmly convinced of the potential of this Conference as a main contributor to the emerging security order. This is why my Government sincerely hopes that the CD will elaborate practical means to increase openness and transparency in the near future, and thereby really contribute to the enhancement of global security.

The chemical weapons convention is one of the most crucial and urgent items on the Conference's agenda, and all of us are expecting the conclusion of the convention before the end of this year. My delegation is pleased to see that the international community shares the political will to achieve this goal, and that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons achieved remarkable progress during the last year. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Russian Ambassador Serguei Batsanov for the progress made under his able leadership, and to assure the final-stage Chairman, German Ambassador von Wagner, of the full support of my delegation in his endeavour to reach compromises on the essential unresolved issues. In the same context, I wish to extend my warm congratulations and respect to Senator Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia for the initiative he took last week. The timing and the manner in which the initiative was taken represents the ardent desire and readiness of the Australian Government to conclude the negotiations within this year. I sincerely hope that the Australian proposal will serve as a catalyst in accelerating the final-phase compromise.

Please allow me to briefly touch upon a couple of the essential pending issues of the CWC. First of all, the verification issue, which is considered the essence of the convention, still faces serious obstacles. As far as challenge inspections are concerned, my delegation shares with most other delegations the opinion that the warning time for the inspections should be kept as short as possible and that challenge proceedings should be kept simple to avoid undesirable delays during inspections. The reason is clear. A would-be violator should by no means be allowed time to destroy or hide evidence of non-compliance with the convention. Unless this could be guaranteed, the challenge proceeding would not become instrumental in achieving the purposes of the convention.

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It is true that there is apprehension about the possibility of abuse. We certainly do not ignore the possibility of industrial or military espionage. My delegation, therefore, has no objection to minimizing the possibility of abuse, but we have a firm belief that fears about abuse should not lead to a verification regime that is not conducive to effective deterrence. In this connection, my delegation has no difficulty in supporting the idea of "observer" participation in the inspection team, regardless of the observer's status, mandatory or not.

Important sectors of the chemical industry, including "relevant" ones, will be affected by implementation of the convention, since the convention's task is to deter, by its verification measures, all attempts to misuse the civilian chemical industry for the production of chemical weapons. In this regard, my delegation wishes to remind the negotiators of the chemical industry's concerns about obtaining a realistic balance between the management of available resources and satisfactory deterrence, without being overburdened with declarations and inspections.

As for the issue of the composition of the executive council, my delegation has no objection to the proposal that geographical equity and industrial development of a region be taken into consideration, and hopes that this issue will soon be settled so that it will not stand in the way of the final conclusion of the convention.

As declared on several occasions in the past, the Republic of Korea will join the forthcoming chemical weapons convention as soon as it is adopted. Our Government shares the view that acquiring universality in the membership of the convention is another important task to be fulfilled. To this end, the final stage of CWC negotiations should proceed in such a manner so as to attract as many States parties as possible. The collapse of the cold war does not by itself guarantee world peace. This is why we are convinced of the new potential of the Conference on Disarmament as a contributor to the emerging security order, and attach great importance to arms control and disarmament. The increasing number of aspirants to full CD membership is a clear reflection of concerns about disarmament. In this regard, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to call upon you to address the long-pending issue of the extension of CD membership, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the negotiations on the CWC, reminding you that at the end of last year the Republic of Korea presented its candidature for membership in the CD.

The end of the East-West rivalry and the coming of the global trend of reconciliation and cooperation have had a favourable impact on the Korean peninsula as well. Contacts and exchanges among the Powers that once belonged to the different ideological groupings on and around the Korean peninsula have increased considerably. As a result, expectations are growing that the counter-productive confrontations of the past will soon be a closed chapter in the history books, and that a durable peace will be achieved. It is our ardent hope that this opportunity for peace and eventual unification should not be missed.

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It is in this context that the Government and people of the Republic of Korea have been stepping up their efforts to come to terms with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and, on that basis, to seek vigorously the eventual reunification of the divided land. In doing so, the Republic of Korea intends to make the best use of improved conditions, and at the same time to contribute to world peace and security by playing its part in the international community.

Our undertakings have begun to pay off in many ways. First and foremost, I wish to draw your attention to the "Agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North" of Korea and the "Joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula", which were effectuated last February.

The reconciliation agreement, which we refer to as the basic agreement, provides such main articles as the recognition of the mutual systems, non-interference in internal affairs, cooperation in the international arena, renunciation of the use of force, peaceful resolution of disputes, promotion of exchanges and cooperation in economic, social, cultural, scientific and humanitarian areas, and the establishment of various bodies that will implement the follow-up measures. This agreement serves as a basic charter that guarantees peaceful coexistence between the South and the North, and ensures the realization of the common aspiration of the Korean people to reach their goal of national reunification.

The joint denuclearization declaration assures that the two sides should not produce or store or use nuclear weapons. Further, the South and the North pledge that they will not have nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. The declaration also has articles on verification and on the establishment of a Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

With the effectuation of the above-mentioned agreements, a political committee, a military committee, and a committee on exchanges and cooperation, as well as the Joint Nuclear Control Commission, were formed and their first meetings were held this month.

Also noteworthy is North Korea's recent indication of its readiness to allow IAEA nuclear inspection of its nuclear facilities by June 1992. As North Korea is a long-time signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the signing of the IAEA safeguards agreement was long overdue. However, despite the long lapse of time, we should now commend North Korea for its decision to sign the safeguards agreement. In this connection, I would like to take this occasion to report to the Conference that there was a symbolic instance of South-North cooperation here in Geneva too. I and my North Korean counterpart, Ambassador Ri, jointly signed a letter asking the Secretary-General of the CD to distribute to the member States the texts of the above-mentioned South-North accords as an official document of the CD, which will be distributed as CD/1147. Though it may appear to be a small move, it is the first of its kind in the relations between South and North Korea. Further, the message that both of us intend to give by such documents amounts to a pledge to the international community to faithfully

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abide by the agreements made between the two sides. Seeing it as a precious bud which needs encouragement from the international community, I would not like to let it go unnoticed.

As the two Koreas move onto the untrodden plain of reconciliation and cooperation, we are faced with new challenges and problems. The most important task before us is undoubtedly the swift and unequivocal implementation of the recent agreements and commitments. In this regard, I note with some apprehension that North Korea, during the first three committee meetings, showed its reluctance to work out concrete measures for the implementation of the basic agreement and that she turned down our proposal of pilot projects, which included such reconciliation measures as the reunion of dispersed family members in the spirit of humanitarianism, and the cessation of slander and vilification directed towards each other. We presented those projects in the belief that they are urgent and easy to carry out.

The nuclear issue still remains a matter of grave and urgent concern. On a bilateral level, the South and the North reached an understanding to commence mutual nuclear inspections from around mid-June. We sincerely hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abides by the above understanding. On the international level, the world community is waiting for North Korea's early ratification of the IAEA safeguards agreement and strict compliance with it. We earnestly hope that North Korea meets the expectations of the international community.

The Republic of Korea firmly believes that the faithful implementation of the basic agreement and the resolution of the nuclear issue will bridge the gap made deeper by long separation and will restore confidence, thus paving the way for reunification. It is with this view that the Government of the Republic of Korea on several occasions urged the Northern brother to swiftly remove all the stumbling-blocks, including nuclear issues, for further progress in inter-Korean relations.

History will record what the international community has achieved in making the world safer in recent years. Among them, the endeavours of this Conference will find their rightful place. However, we still have a long way to go. The Republic of Korea will spare no effort in doing its part internationally as well as regionally.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Prakash Shah.

Mr. SHAH (India): Let me first of all welcome the very important statement made by the President of the Swiss Confederation this morning at the beginning of the session. Mr. President, allow me also to congratulate you on your assumption of this office of the presidency in the Conference on Disarmament. Your stewardship so far has only confirmed my delegation's faith in your sincerity and fairness and in your undoubted abilities to guide the deliberations forward. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation

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for the able way in which Ambassador Mutuale Kikanke of Zaire guided our work during the previous month. I would also like to extend a very friendly and sincere welcome to Ambassador Berasategui in his new and well-deserved incarnation as Secretary-General of the Conference and as Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

All of us have at one time or the other spoken of the massive changes in the Eastern part of Europe and the consequent emergence of a number of independent countries. Much has been said about the implications of these dramatic changes on politics, economics and security of this and other regions. What has not been adequately emphasized is that, with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, nuclear proliferation issues have assumed a qualitatively and quantitatively new dimension. A crucial dimension of global security today is the cloud of uncertainty surrounding control over some of the existing nuclear arsenals. Peace and security could be threatened by the frightening possibility of the proliferation of ready-made nuclear weapons by a variety of means and methods. The number of nuclear-weapon Powers has increased not because a new nuclear weapon has been produced by a non-nuclear-weapon State but because there has been massive vertical proliferation in the last 23 years since the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty was negotiated in 1968. Despite the NPT, there are today more nuclear weapons stationed in a larger number of countries with more tenuous control over their use than at any other time. And yet, what seems to concern the world is not the danger of nuclear conflagration from existing nuclear warheads spread around, as it were, the warehouses in several countries, but the obsessive apprehension that the monopoly of existing nuclear-weapon Powers over nuclear weapons may be broken by some "irresponsible" country from the South. In this vastly changed scenario the question arises whether it is realistic to achieve non-proliferation through a treaty signed in 1968 which obviously and logically could not have taken into account this new and frightening reality.

Ever since India, along with seven other countries, proposed a nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1965 in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), we have repeatedly urged that non-proliferation must be addressed in all its aspects if humanity is to be saved from a nuclear disaster. Surely, if this had happened, we would not have been in a situation today where we have a number of differing estimates of how many nuclear warheads exist in the States which used to be jointly described as the Soviet Union. We would certainly not be in a situation where the question of accountability and control of large numbers of nuclear warheads is so unresolved. We would not have been worried, as we worry today, about what to do with those brilliant scientists in the former Soviet Union whose expertise is to produce nuclear weapons. The world would not have been apprehensive, as we are today, of smuggling of fissionable material or clandestine transfer of a nuclear weapon to terrorists. But the hard truth is that we are in this situation because the overwhelming focus of all efforts at non-proliferation has been to prevent non-nuclear-weapon countries from acquiring nuclear weapons, while nuclear weapons proliferated in geometric proportions, new generations of nuclear weapons were invented and deployed and greater sophistication in death and destruction achieved in nuclear-weapon States. There are many factors responsible for this sad state of affairs, and the complacency generated by

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the illusion that a discriminatory NPT will solve the proliferation problems is one of them. It is the failure of the NPT to provide an acceptable balance of mutual responsibility and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States which not only allowed but may even have encouraged proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. Since 1968, several non-nuclear-weapon States have developed or acquired sophisticated technology in the nuclear field. While such knowledge is primarily devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it often does not exclude the ability to use it for military purposes. While non-nuclear-weapon States such as India scrupulously adhered to a policy of non-proliferation despite acquiring the capability to use nuclear energy for military purposes, and refrained from assisting any other State to develop nuclear weapons, there was free and frantic competition amongst nuclear-weapon States to reach the pinnacle of achievement in acquiring nuclear destructive capacity to destroy the world many times over.

This is today's reality. To ignore reality, to emphasise it where convenient and to deny it where it is inconvenient, to behave as if the major issue today is horizontal proliferation of the kind that worried some people 15 or 20 years ago while ignoring the horrors through proliferation which can take place because of political and constitutional changes, and because of vertical proliferation, is to ignore the lessons of history. And where history is forgotten it unfortunately tends to repeat itself.

It is in this context, not so much in anger at this grim reality but more in sorrow that the real issues have been ignored, that my delegation once again wishes to urge all members of this Conference, and indeed of the United Nations, that the only realistic solution to stop proliferation is to have a global and comprehensive approach to the problem. Regional arrangements, bilateral agreements, nuclear-weapon-free zones and other technical fixes, which have become popular over the last two decades, have clearly failed to arrest the number of nuclear weapons from growing qualitatively or quantitatively. Nor have they succeeded in preventing an increase in the number of countries with possible control over divided nuclear arsenals. As stated by my Prime Minister at the recent Security Council summit meeting in New York, while we share the concerns with regard to proliferation, we do not believe that partial measures of prevention or punitive action on a selective basis will achieve desired results. Just as chemical and biological weapons are matters of global concern to be dealt with globally, nuclear weapons and the nuclear threat cannot be addressed without a global approach. A new international understanding and consensus on what constitutes non-proliferation is urgently required so that the pursuit of a global approach to non-proliferation which is universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory is seriously attempted.

When India presented a specific action plan for elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in stages, eventually leading to a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world, as an ultimate goal at the third special session on disarmament in 1988, few people gave it the attention it deserved. There are those who talk of non-proliferation but are afraid of even accepting a nuclear-weapon-free world as the ultimate goal. What we put

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forward in 1988 as an action plan for all to follow is what we have followed all these years and what we are prepared to do in future. Our programme proposes elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in stages, and in a systematic, rational and practical time-frame aims to achieve, in relation to nuclear weapons, what we are doing here in the Conference on Disarmament in relation to chemical weapons. Our plan recognises the need for flexibility in the staging of these measures. It calls upon all States, nuclear, threshold and others, to accept equal obligations without discrimination. It provides for a stage-by-stage controlled slide down the ladder to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

When the action plan was put forward, some nuclear-weapon States expressed difficulty in accepting these ideas in view of their adherence to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The doctrine, we were told, was anchored in the specific context of East-West confrontation and the cold war. There is now no such confrontation. The cold war is over. The nuclear stand-off is a thing of the past and nuclear deterrence has become an irrelevant doctrine. What then is preventing the serious consideration of this plan at the global level? Why is it that there are no constructive suggestions to make this plan an acceptable one? Why does the world continue to put its faith in achieving non-proliferation through a discriminatory Treaty which was written in 1968 and which could not have taken into account the realities of the present situation and technological advances, which should be the basis for our future cooperative effort to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation?

We are encouraged that there are some positive signs of changes in the thinking of at least some nuclear-weapon Powers on this crucial issue and at this crucial juncture. In his address to the Conference on Disarmament of 12 February 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of the Russian Federation acknowledged that the total elimination of nuclear weapons would offer the best solution. We invite those who believe in it to work with us in reaching that goal. We are encouraged that the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty has been advocated not only by the Russian Federation but by many countries even within the Western group. We see greater acceptance of the need for a fundamental review of the entire military and strategic situation in the world and consequently the revision of old military doctrines including nuclear deterrence. In keeping with our long-standing proposal for an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, we were heartened by the proposals made by Foreign Minster Kozyrev regarding non-targeting of strategic nuclear weapons, taking these weapons off their alert status and keeping delivery vehicles and warheads separate. We see progress in the thinking, notably of the Russian Federation, that all nuclear-weapon States should join the process of nuclear disarmament.

Another long-standing issue which now assumes critical importance in the context of announced unilateral decisions to cut the number of nuclear weapons and to destroy nuclear warheads is the question of fissile material. Experts indicate that the destruction or dismantling of the nuclear warheads in the States which constituted the erstwhile Soviet Union, variously estimated at between 27,000 and 32,000 warheads, could result in the release of fissile

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material estimated in hundreds of tonnes. What will happen to this fissile material? Will it be redeployed in technologically more advanced nuclear weapons? Or will it be surrendered to IAEA or some other agency for generation of nuclear energy for development? It was apprehension on this score which prompted India to seek a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and fissile material as early as SSOD-II in 1982 and subsequently to present a paper at SSOD-III on new technologies and the qualitative arms race. Even though these aspects of proliferation are less publicized because they are less convenient, they are equally issues of major concern and should be addressed without delay. To dismiss proposals to freeze production of fissile material as outdated is to ignore yet again the reality.

Given the fact that all States are concerned with nuclear disarmament, we believe that the ideas outlined above should be discussed in a comprehensive manner and in a formal setting in the context of agenda items 2 and 3 of this Conference. The issue of a nuclear test ban has assumed increasing importance in the present-day context. It is therefore logical to hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1 of the CD this year should be re-established with an improved mandate after thorough discussions which were undertaken in the Ad Hoc Committee last year. On many occasions in the past, my delegation has pointed out that while a lot of groundwork has already been done on the issue of a nuclear test ban, the stage has now been reached when there should be a consensus amongst States to seriously negotiate on a nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is heartening that a large number of countries in Europe have begun to see the need for a nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is our hope that all member States of the CD will soon arrive at a consensus on this issue.

The recommendations regarding priorities in the field of disarmament endorsed by the international community at SSOD-I have never been translated into universally accepted norms, principles and processes to deal with the dangers and to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons. The adoption of an "arms control" approach, as distinct and different from the "disarmament" framework, has failed to arrest proliferation and is unlikely to provide a viable paradigm for the future. Closed-door "clubs", "groups" and "regimes" created to impose unilateral restrictions on trade in technology, equipment and material on a discriminatory basis will not prevent proliferation. Non-proliferation, whether of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, cannot be achieved by proposals aimed only at arms reduction, though they are welcome. Nor can initiatives which in reality only preserve the monopoly of a few States over weapons of mass destruction, missile technology and export markets for conventional weapons contribute to prevention of proliferation. To justify preservation of such monopolies by hypothesizing potential threats from developing countries not only smacks of pandering to the vested interests of the scientific-military-industrial complexes but introduces a dangerous North-South dimension in nuclear disarmament which is, and should be addressed as, a global issue which does not need such confrontation.

Within the context of this arms limitation approach, the United States of America and the former Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation have announced unilateral cuts in certain categories of nuclear weapons. Any

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attempt to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and warheads is indeed a welcome step. We commend them, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, who have announced their intention to reduce the numbers and we call upon those nuclear-weapon Powers who have not made any move in this regard to take matching positive steps. However, much more confidence would be generated and greater credibility created if the Conference on Disarmament were to be informed, from time to time, about the programme of action to implement the announced cuts, the number of nuclear weapons or warheads destroyed or dismantled, the manner of such destruction, the use to which fissile material removed from those weapons had been put, and so on. If transparency is important in regard to conventional armaments, would it not be equally applauded if practiced in regard to destruction and dismantling of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction?

Building confidence through transparency and dialogue is a cornerstone of India's foreign policy. In recent months, high-level political contacts between India and China have further advanced the bonds of friendship. We have also agreed on a number of measures to reduce tension along our borders including regular meetings of border personnel, establishment of communication links at border points and prior intimation regarding military exercises. Economic, social and cultural cooperation in diverse fields under the umbrella of SAARC has been stepped up among the nations of the Indian subcontinent.

Agreements have been concluded between India and Pakistan on advance notification of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, prevention of airspace violations, permitting overflights and landings of military aircraft and setting up of hotlines between the two sides.

In the field of chemical weapons, in anticipation of the early conclusion of a multilateral global convention on their prohibition now being negotiated here in the CD, India proposed a bilateral arrangement with Pakistan last year. We are happy to inform that at the last round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan, it was agreed to consider issuing a joint declaration on chemical weapons and to convene a meeting of experts of the two sides to exchange views on a bilateral agreement to ban the development, production, deployment and use of chemical weapons.

In the nuclear field, an agreement between India and Pakistan on the prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear facilities was signed in December 1988. I am happy to inform that lists of these nuclear facilities were finally exchanged under this agreement on 1 January 1992.

In 1950, India recommended the creation of a United Nations Peace Fund to channelize savings resulting from controls on the growth of armaments as a "peace dividend", a phrase that has gained currency after the INF Treaty was signed in 1987. The arms build-up, spiralled by the increased military expenditure of the big military spenders and exporters of armaments, affects developing countries doubly: in the first place, the proliferating expenditure on armaments reduces the resources available for economic development and growth; and secondly, it fuels further competitive expenditure on account of perceived defence requirements for the security needs of the

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developing countries. India has all along advocated that steps should be taken to curb this tendency and trend. Unfortunately, without self-restraint on the part of the big industrialized arms suppliers and curtailment of financial assistance for purchase of weapons, this may just be a pipedream. We are impressed that everybody wants transparency in arms transfers but we are concerned that transparency is becoming an end in itself. In our view, transparency would serve no purpose if it does not achieve the objective of reduction in arms transfers.

India is fully committed to the conclusion of a universal and non-discriminatory chemical weapons convention, which is being negotiated at the CD, by the end of 1992. While it is essential that the convention does not have any loophole for developing chemical weapons, it is equally essential to ensure that States parties to this convention are not subjected to a dual regime of controls. It is necessary that all existing discriminatory restrictions on trade relating to scheduled chemicals as well as equipment are removed immediately upon entry into force of the convention. Given the fact that the convention will contain effective measures to control any form of proliferation of chemical weapons and would also have the force of effective sanctions against potential violators, there is no reason why States parties to the convention should continue to be subjected to any unilaterally imposed punitive control regime outside the convention, which is essentially discriminatory in nature. We believe that a successful resolution of this issue in the chemical weapons negotiations will ensure a healthy universality for the convention. The ideal way to ensure universality to this convention is to make it attractive for countries to join it. To this end, the interest of those who possess chemical weapons must be matched by the interests of those who do not, and yet are prepared to accept curbs on their chemical industry, which plays an important role in their development, in the hope of achieving enhanced security.

The routine verification system under the convention must ensure that the need for compliance is centred only around the relevant chemical industry, is focused, is easily implementable and is affordable. It is important that the selection process for inspection is non-discriminatory and is designed for equal application in all regions of the world.

The proposed CWC envisages challenge inspection procedures as a unique measure in global disarmament arrangements. Once the request for a challenge inspection is received, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes the concern of all States parties, who are then legitimately involved in seeking reassurances that the convention is not being violated. The multilateral character of the challenge inspection, therefore, needs to be ensured. All States should be concerned with minimizing the possible misuse of the challenge provisions through unfounded and frivolous requests, which would not only damage the international reputation of the challenged State, but also result in a waste of resources of the organization. This requires a very definite role for the organization, and also requires that the challenge provisions are practical, with equal rights for the challenged and requesting State party. It is for this reason that India has supported the provisions of

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"managed access" and other practical measures envisaged in CD/CW/WP.352, put forward by the delelgations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia.

All States parties have the right to be represented on the executive council, taking into account the need for representation based on geographical spread. However, within the regions, it is essential that due weight is given to those with a developed chemical industry since they will clearly be affected much more than those who do not have it. The industrial weighting could be calculated on the basis of the total production, range of chemicals produced as well as number of facilities in a given State party.

The development of schedules and guidelines under the convention has taken place under presently existing conditions. The convention should be able to take into account future scientific and technological developments, and should not be fossilized. Accordingly, it is necessary to have a fairly simple amendment procedure at least for the technical aspects of the convention. At the same time, attempts should not be made to include chemicals which are used in legitimate peaceful activities, such as herbicides and riot control agents.

Concern has been expressed about the ability of CD to negotiate a CWC by the autumn of this year. In my delegation's view, it is possible for us in the CD to have such a convention in place this year provided we resist the temptation to overload it with excessive details and provided the concerns of the countries working towards economic growth and development are not ignored.

I had occasion to commend the initiative of the Australian Foreign Minister presented to the CD last week, to speed up the process of negotiation of the CWC. We are ready to cooperate fully with Ambassador von Wagner, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, regardless of the procedure that he decides to adopt as a basis for our future work. We would, of course, be indicating to him further our views and concerns on the major unresolved issues during the consultations he proposes to hold in the inter-sessional period.

Apprehensions have often been expressed about the role of the Conference on Disarmament after the CWC. My delegation does not share these apprehensions. We have a number of items of the agenda which are as important as the CWC and the CD will be contributing greatly to the disarmament process by taking them up seriously for negotiations. If the Conference on Disarmament, for some reason, does become irrelevant after CWC, as some countries seem to fear, it will surely not be due to lack of subjects to be discussed or issues to be negotiated. The danger lies in the lack of political will to do so, fear perhaps of transparency and deliberate downgrading of the multilaterial process in priority areas of disarmament.

Before I end, let me, on a personal note, express my sadness at the departure from Geneva on transfer of two of our most distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, who are making their last appearances in this forum as ambassadors of disarmament of their respective countries. I want to thank them for their contribution to

(Mr. Shah, India)

our work and I wish them well in their future activities and life. I should also like to request the delegation of Ethiopia to convey our good wishes to Ambassador Kongit Sinegiorgis, who will also be leaving us shortly.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for his very important statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, as this is my first intervention during your presidency, allow me to begin by welcoming your accession to the position and assuring you of my delegation's full cooperation and support. I would also, at this final plenary meeting of the first part of the 1992 session, join with those who have already noted with regret the impending departures of our colleagues Ambassadors Solesby, Donowaki and Sinegiorgis, whose past contributions to our work have been of such importance. More personally, they have been helpful colleagues and good friends. I and my fellow Canadians will miss them very much. In the case of Ambassador Sinegiorgis, we are very pleased that she will soon become her country's Ambassador to my country. I also want to thank both Ambassadors Solesby and Donowaki for their wery thoughtful statements this morning.

I will be brief and I will limit my comments to the chemical weapons convention. Last Thursday, we witnessed a highly important development in our efforts to finalize a convention, and that, of course, was the presentation by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, of a draft of a model compromise text for the convention. In our view, this text represents an extraordinary achievement, both in terms of its substance and in terms of the remarkable amount of effort involved. My authorities are deeply appreciative of the Australian Government's initiative, and welcome this document as a very valuable contribution to finalizing the convention in the next four months.

My authorities also welcome and applaud the strong, positive response given to this initiative by so many delegations at last Thursday's meeting. In view of this support, we believe that this document will provide many valuable bases for resolving the outstanding issues still before us. We therefore join the Australian and other delegations in urging the Ad Hoc Committee and its Chairman to begin immediately to give the fullest possible consideration to its various proposals in their future work.

In this respect, my authorities are pleased to note the programme of action proposed by Ambassador von Wagner, in particular his intention to use the Australian text in conjunction with the "rolling text" and other documents as the basis for further private and open-ended consultations over the next six weeks, with a view to producing an overall Chairman's text as soon as possible. We therefore fully endorse his intention to make the maximum use of the inter-sessional period, and hope that it will be possible to produce this final compromise text by the beginning of our spring session on 11 May, or very soon thereafter.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

It should be needless to say that my delegation and I offer Ambassador von Wagner our full cooperation and assistance in these final months to find the necessary compromises to produce a final draft convention. In so doing, however, my delegation will continue to strive to achieve a convention that is truly global, comprehensive, and - above all - effectively verifiable. As other speakers today have noted, effective verification is the key to ensuring the success of the proposed convention - the essential element that will take us beyond existing agreements and establish a new bench-mark. And effective verification depends on the interdependence of all phases in the proposed verification process, both routine and challenge, which we see as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.

Accordingly, my delegation will continue to seek a routine inspection regime that covers all facilities, including "capable" facilities, that might be engaged in activities that are relevant to the goals of the convention. And we will continue to seek a challenge inspection regime that provides the fullest possible degree of access to the challenged site consistent with the intent of article IX, using managed access as necessary; a regime that requires the shortest possible time-frames, to forestall concealment of evidence; and a regime that contains sufficiently strong provisions on "perimeters" and "securing the site" to enable the inspection team to discharge their functions.

On the basis, we would be concerned if the proposals in the Australian text covering these matters were to be weakened, or to be compromised by changes in the relevant articles or annexes. In our view, the text as it now stands still falls short of the requisite level of intrusiveness consistent with credible verification, and can be improved. But it would be an acceptable bottom line for finalizing our negotiations.

The presentation of the Australian text opens a window of opportunity that we must take maximum advantage of if we are to achieve our common goal of finalizing the convention this year. It is in this spirit that Canada supports this very substantial work which Australia has placed at our disposal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Dichev.

Mr. DICHEV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, allow me, at the outset, to congratulate you on your election to this high post of the Conference on Disarmament, and to assure you of the readiness of the Bulgarian delegation to assist in the discharge of your responsible duties. We are convinced that your diplomatic skill, tactfulness and vast knowledge are valuable assets in achieving the goals of this unique forum for multilateral negotiations. Your accession to the Chair coincides with an important, I would say even a decisive period in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This is a period, indeed, when at stake is the issue whether the chemical weapons convention will be or will not be this year. Your personal contribution to resolve this issue is certainly a major one.

(Mr. Dichev, Bulgaria)

I am particularly pleased to extend my congratulations also to His Excellency Ambassador Vicente Berasategui on his appointment as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. His rich experience in multilateral diplomacy is a blessing for the Conference on Disarmament not only with regard to the finalization of the chemical weapons convention, but also for the period immediately following it. For this will be an intense period, and the CD should rightfully consider itself most lucky to be able to benefit from personalities like His Excellency Vicente Berasategui. The Bulgarian delegation shall do its best to contribute to his laudable efforts.

I am happy to extend a traditional Bulgarian dobre doshli, which means "warm welcome", to the CD to the heads of the CD delegations of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Mongolia, His Excellency Ambassador M. Servais, and His Excellency Ambassador S. Yumjav, to wish them lots of success ahead.

My delegation listened with great attention to the speech of the President of the country which has given shelter to the Conference on Disarmament and its delegations. We all owe much to Switzerland and its Government for our excellent conditions of work. The Bulgarian delegation welcomes the statement of the President of the Swiss Confederation, His Excellency Mr. René Felber, as a firm indication of his country's commitment to the noble endeavours of the Conference on Disarmament.

At its 19 March plenary meeting the Conference on Disarmament heard His Excellency the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Evans. He introduced a paper which my delegation, just like many other delegations, assesses highly. We see it as appearing at the right time just as the need was felt for an accelerator of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons on the few remaining outstanding problems. The Australian paper is a feasible compromise effort which, together with the "rolling text", could bring our debate to a successful outcome. It is a matter of fact that our Australian colleagues in Canberra and here, in Geneva, have done a great job to put together such a text, something I should like to thank them for.

In this connection I might also recall to the distinguished colleagues that the current "rolling text" has been created after lots of sweat throughout the lengthy negotiating process, therefore it is logical that it serves as basis for the future convention. Consequently, in the view of my delegation successive versions of the "rolling text" should be titled "Revision 1", "Revision 2", etc., in accordance with existing United Nations practice.

As to the Australian idea to hold a ministerial-level conference late this summer, my delegation is ready to assist for a mutually acceptable settlement of all outstanding issues of the future chemical weapons convention by that time.

Challenge inspection is a key element in the monitoring system of the future convention. As to its universality we think that this unique international treaty should reliably guarantee the balance between monitoring

(Mr. Dichev, Bulgaria)

efficiency and protection of incoming confidential information. Non-resolved issues like the role of the executive council, the dangers of abuse and the question of the observer should be subordinated to the goal of guaranteeing to the highest degree the efficiency and objectives of the convention. Such objectives could hardly be fostered by politicizing the issue of inspections at any stage of their implementation. My delegation is in favour also of the new approach to integrate a major and relevant part of international chemical industry in a more comprehensive system of verification. We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that extending the scope of verification in the civil chemical industry should be in tune with the limited human and financial resources of the envisaged international organization. Therefore, normative financial provisions ought to be sufficiently precise, they should take into account also the legitimate interests of States parties.

The Bulgarian delegation welcomes the encouraging results of the efforts to coordinate the texts on the criteria and composition of the executive council. The conceptual approach has brought the different variants down to just two, where the common elements can be reached by specific text formulations. In this connection may I commend Ambassador Tibor Tóth and wish him a successful conclusion to the responsible task he has taken upon himself, a task to which he devotes so much time and energy? In this regard I wish to raise a point of a more general nature. This particular problem as well as all other provisions of the future convention should be resolved by the 39 CD member States and the 40 or so observers. A prime objective, however, should be to arrive at balanced decisions capable of satisfying not only those 79 or so States, but also many other United Nations Member States which ought to join the convention. This is why the Conference on Disarmament should take into account also the legitimate interests of countries that are not among its members but are, nevertheless, active participants in the international community. For instance, to the difference of other geographic regions the only region to have increased its member States is Eastern Europe. This region may yet increase in member States. It could be that some of those newly formed States would not necessarily belong to the Eastern European Group, rather to some other one. Be it as it may, it is a matter of fact that the European process started with 35 States. Today it numbers 51 States, with the new countries having found a deserving place in it. To my delegation this is an indication that such developments speak in favour of the existing United Nations regional groups. Furthermore, it is obvious that the composition of the executive council should reflect in a just and equitable manner the membership of the future convention. In light of these considerations my delegation submits that there is room for further clarification of the ways and means to allocate seats on the executive council for the various regional groups. My delegation holds the view also that the regional groups furnish the framework for coordinating the degree of implementation of industrial and other criteria, including the well-known principle of rotation.

To conclude my statement may I be allowed to appeal to the delegations in this chamber not to miss the opportunity to concentrate their efforts to conclude the final text of the future convention, so that the CD may continue to function as a reliable and unique international forum in the field of

(Mr. Dichev, Bulgaria)

global disarmament? The Bulgarian delegation is optimistic and has faith in the successful finalization of the convention by the end of this year. May I assure you, Mr. President, you the representative of a country having traditional excellent relations with Bulgaria, and through you all my distinguished colleagues, that my delegation would spare no effort in the accomplishment of this lofty goal? I submit that it is most important for the CD at this stage not to lose momentum!

Finally, let me say a few parting words with respect to three distinguished colleagues and friends. This plenary meeting is the last in which we had the pleasure to benefit from the active participation of the representatives of Japan, the United Kingdom and Ethiopia. His Excellency Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki and their Excellencies Ambassadors Tessa Solesby and Kongit Sinegiorgis. Their contribution to the CD, and to the drafting of the convention in particular, is a most tangible one. We will certainly miss them, because over the next two CD sessions this year we will have to overcome the remaining differences. But we know that in their hearts and minds they will be with us, and that they will continue their endeavour to achieve the lofty objectives of the future chemical weapons convention. May I take this opportunity to cordially wish to those three distinguished friends and representatives of three leading nations of the world in the Conference on Disarmament sound health, happiness and lots of success in their activities to promote the peaceful development of our planet?

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair and my country. I now give the floor to Mrs. Clauwaert, the representative of Venezuela.

Mrs. CLAUWAERT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Sir, on behalf of the delegation of Venezuela I wish to inform you of our special pleasure at seeing you Chair the work of this forum. We are aware of your extensive abilities, your personal career and your knowledge of the subjects that we are to deal with, so that the Conference will benefit from your skilled leadership. We extend our thanks to the permanent representatives of Yugoslavia and Zaire, Ambassadors Naste Calovski and Mutuale Kikanke, for the effective way in which they guided our work. It is also appropriate to congratulate Ambassador Vicente Berasategui on his appointment as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Ambassador Berasategui has the best qualities to discharge such an important function. We would also take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki of Japan, Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Kongit Sinegiorgis of Ethiopia, who made important contributions to the work of this Conference. We wish them success in their new functions. We have the honour of having heard today the President of the Swiss Confederation and Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency René Felber. We express thanks for the constructive contributions made by the Swiss Government to the work of this Conference in its capacity as an observer.

(Mrs. Clauwaert, Venezuela)

Now I wish to refer briefly at this plenary meeting to the subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Government of Venezuela attaches very high priority to the early conclusion of the convention whereby chemical weapons will be completely and generally banned, and supports all efforts that are made to that end. It is for this reason that as members of the Conference on Disarmament we have been participating actively in the negotiations on the convention, and we are committed to its conclusion this year. This commitment is set forth explicitly in the recent declaration signed by the heads of State of the member countries of the Andean Group in Cartegena de Indias, Colombia on 4 December 1991 on renunciation of weapons of mass destruction. In that declaration Venezuela announced its intention to be an original signatory of the convention. We have expectations of an early conclusion of the negotiations, but in order to finally attain the desired and agreed goal, additional and constant efforts will be required as well as an extraordinary display of political will to solve the problems that are still awaiting solution in order to arrive at agreed formulas on challenge inspection, verification, membership of the executive council, economic and technological development, old chemical weapons and financial aspects of the organization. In this context we welcome with great pleasure and interest the proposal introduced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Senator Gareth Evans, in the Conference on Disarmament, on 19 March last, concerning the draft convention for a complete ban on chemical weapons. We consider that the initiative submitted by the Australian Government can serve as an important element in the ongoing negotiations, in view of their urgent nature. This proposal contains a series of constructive suggestions that should be taken into consideration in the negotiating process - for example, the structure it suggests for the convention; and concrete recommendations in order to try to resolve the outstanding issues that require a decision. It is to be hoped that these suggestions will help us to achieve a balanced agreement, and to facilitate the convening of a ministrial meeting designed to give a last push to the negotiations. It is our understanding that the intention of this proposal, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia stressed in his statement, is not to replace in any way the work and the achievements so far of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on the draft convention, or to establish a parallel track. This is work which has taken up a great deal of time and effort on our part, and which should not be sidestepped, but there is a need for concrete contributions from our countries in order to give impetus to the negotiations.

We would like to express appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner, for the persistent efforts that he has been making to solve certain delicate aspects. These efforts certainly call for cooperation from the members of the Conference. Ambassador von Wagner can count on the full support of our delegation in the pursuit of this process. In this context we endorse the suggestion that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should carry out consultations in the inter-sessional period of the Conference on Disarmament so that, in so far as he is able, he can submit a specific text at the beginning of the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, in May 1992.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Venezuela for her statement and for her kind words addressed to the Chair. We have reached the end of the speakers' list for today. I would like to know whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor. I see none. Before proceeding to other matters, and in the light of the information we have received during this meeting that the permanment representative of Ethiopia is also going to leave us soon, and since she is not in the room, it will be my pleasure to address to her directly on behalf of all of you best wishes in her future mission as her country's representative in Canada. I wish her good luck and I ask her delegation to convey to her our best wishes for success in her new tasks on the part of the members of the Conference on Disarmament. During these meetings, and today in particular, we are witnessing large-scale departures by many eminent members of our Conference. I would simply hope that this process will come to a stop, at least during Algeria's presidency, and that the positive elements in the Conference will not leave us during the few days for which the Algerian delegation will be in the Chair.

I will now pass to another matter. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events had intended today to introduce the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test, GSETT-2, and the Ad Hoc Group's progress report. Mr. Ola Dahlman has informed me that as he is indisposed he has been unable to leave Sweden and therefore cannot speak to you as planned. He asks me to inform you that the English text of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test has been distributed today as CD/1144. The text of the document in all the other official languages of the Conference will be distributed during the break between the first and second parts of the annual session. The text of the progress report, on the thirty-third session of the Group has been distributed today as CD/1145 in all the official languages of the Conference. Consequently, Mr. Dahlman will be introducting these two reports at the plenary session on Thursday, 14 May. In accordance with our usual practice, I will place before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of the progress report at the plenary meeting scheduled for Thursday 21 May. The recommendation relates to the date of the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, which should take place between 27 July and 7 August 1992. The Conference will also be taking note of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test contained in document CD/1144.

I would also like to inform you that the consultations on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of the agenda, entitled "nuclear test ban", will have to continue before the Conference is in a position to take a decision. I have already referred to the role played in these consultations by our friend Ambassador Donowaki, and I would like to thank him very much for the way in which he has worked to try to achieve an agreement. The special coordinator on item 1 of the agenda, Ambassador Shah of India, will be holding informal consultations open to all

(The President)

delegations tomorrow, Friday 27 March at 3 p.m. in this conference room; interpretation will be provided. I hope that we will then be able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the second session of the Conference.

At my request the secretariat has distributed today the timetable of meetings that the Conference and its subsidiary bodies are due to hold during the first week of the second part of the annual session. The timetable was compiled in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies and, as usual, it is purely indicative and can be changed if the need arises. As you will note, the first informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", is scheduled for Thursday 14 May, immediately after the plenary meeting that day, as decided by the Conference at its 617th plenary meeting. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): As we also decided at our 618th plenary meeting, the special coordinator appointed to hold consultations on the question of transparency in armaments Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, will be holding informal consultations open to all delegations immediately after the end of this plenary meeting, in this room.

I would also like to inform members of the Conference that the consultations on the Disarmament Commission which were scheduled for today at 3 p.m. in room VIII, have been cancelled.

Since our order of business for today has been completed, I will now adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 14 May at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.620
25 May 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 May 1992, at 10 a.m

President: Mr. Abdelhamid SEMICHI (Algeria)

GE.92-61466/4520B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 620th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf I would like to bid a warm welcome to the new representatives of Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassadors Yoshitomo Tanaka and Sir Michael Weston, who have just been accredited to the Conference and are among us for the first time today. I would like to assure them of the cooperation of my delegation in all the Conference's work, and to wish them every success in their new functions. I would also like to cordially welcome Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who is taking part in our debate today for the first time. I am sure that the Conference will listen to his statement with special attention. On behalf of the Conference, and on behalf of my delegation as well, I would also like to extend to him our best wishes for success in his important post.

On the list of speakers, apart from the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, are the representatives of Turkey, Belgium, Kenya and Japan, as well as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Mr. Dahlman will be introducing the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test (GSETT-2) and the Ad Hoc Group's progress report, which have been distributed as documents CD/1144 and CD/1145. I now give the floor to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky.

Mr. PETROVSKY (United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs): Mr. President, may I, at the outset, thank you for the kind words of welcome that you have extended to me and for your wishes concerning the responsibilities facing me?

It is indeed an honour and a pleasure for me to address this Conference. On the one hand, I am representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations and would like to convey his personal and warm greetings to all of you. On the other hand, I am also attending this meeting for the first time in my new capacity as Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, responsible for political and security issues, including disarmament. However, this august hall and the Conference on Disarmament are not new to me. I feel that I am among friends of long standing. There are many present with whom I have developed a close relationship in the past and I am looking forward to making new friends as we work together to meet the new challenges and extraordinary opportunities which now exist in international relations.

(Mr. Petrovsky, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs)

Within a short span of time the contours of international security have radically changed. The end of the cold war and the start of major arms reductions have placed disarmament in a totally different perspective. Rather than being aimed primarily at maintaining a balance of power between two military alliances, arms control and disarmament are now increasingly recognized also as constituents of an international security agenda in which issues should be addressed through preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping.

Amidst these changes, we need to ask ourselves some basic questions about the future of disarmament. What are the principal challenges? What should be our priorities? How should we best direct our efforts to achieve solid success in this very important field of international cooperation? I should like to offer some preliminary thoughts on these vital questions and on the implications for the ways in which disarmament diplomacy will be conducted in the future.

Long-established agenda items still remain and need to be pursued with energy and pragmatism, but at the same time we must not allow ourselves to remain prisoners of the past. The challenge of change is upon us and it is my deep belief that we should respond by looking again at the whole conceptual basis of the disarmament process.

The threat of conflict among the major Powers has declined dramatically, practically to the point of non-existence. Nuclear and conventional stockpiles are also in decline; and the pace of weapons modernization, especially in the area of nuclear armaments, seems to have diminished significantly. Our old preoccupations with the offensive character of nuclear force postures have now given way to growing concerns over the safe handling, storage, and disposal of weapons.

These developments, however, do not render the pursuit of disarmament irrelevant or obsolete. On the contrary, as this new era unfolds, the world is still beset with tensions, violence and the burden of overarmament. We are in particular witnessing a major upsurge in ethnic and intra-State tensions, often leading to violence on a distressingly large scale. This trend is an unmistakably worldwide phenomenon and one that poses a severe challenge to traditional methods of conflict resolution.

Fortunately, as the bilateral era has passed, the impulse for multilateral action to deal with emerging threats to peace and security has markedly increased. We can discern a new assertiveness within the intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations as well as outside the organization, along with a deepened involvement in the responsibilities of the Secretariat, ranging from conflict mediation and peace-keeping to monitoring, inspection and weapons disposal as part of activities duly authorized by the Security Council.

(Mr. Petrovsky, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs)

I also believe that we have arrived at the stage where the processes and techniques of arms regulation and disarmament need no longer be viewed only in the realm of theory. Instead, they are matters for practical action. The implementation of the multifaceted techniques of information exchange, observation, inspection, monitoring and weapons disposal is proving to be a very healthy experience these days. Sometimes, problems thought to exist during negotiations are found to have simple solutions in the field, while the practical application itself sometimes reveals situations - and solutions - previously unimagined at the negotiating table. The consistent common denominator, however, is the development of confidence and mutual trust born from interaction between human beings. I might add, as a personal aside, that from this I infer that we should not try to negotiate minutely for every possible contingency: there comes a stage when a certain risk has to be taken. If the spirit is right, human common sense will find the solution in the field.

It is one thing to identify the roles and contributions of disarmament, but quite another to gain agreement on an agenda that is balanced and relevant to real security needs. All of us face major challenges ahead, both in deciding on the direction of future multilateral negotiations and in completing work on major outstanding items. Rather than address the specific items on your agenda, I should like to comment briefly on several general areas where innovative thinking and concerted diplomatic effort are urgently needed.

The first area concerns the continuing spread - in all its aspects - of the tools and technologies of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Without question, this issue has moved today to the forefront of international concerns. In the wake of the Persian Gulf war, there is a heightened sensitivity to weapons proliferation and the potential for the spread of advanced weapons capability to ignite the embers of regional conflict. In its 31 January meeting at the level of heads of State and government, the Security Council spoke to this point by declaring that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and by committing itself to take appropriate action to prevent the spread of such weapons. The question is how to translate such sentiments into concrete practical action.

By its very nature, the problem of proliferation defies simple solutions. Clearly, one element of sound policy must be responsible behaviour by States to control sources of supply without, however, curbing transfers of technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries. Another element must be the active exercise of self-restraint on the part of prospective recipients. Yet the non-proliferation effort does not end there. Further substantive progress on nuclear disarmament, both quantitative and qualitative, is also necessary. It is imperative that the significant reductions in nuclear arms agreed to so far be translated into actions at an

(Mr. Petrovsky, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs)

early date and not be sidetracked by the course of political events. At the same time, the possibility of illegal transfers of weapons earmarked for elimination presents new potential for proliferation, as does the possibility of scientists and other technical personnel taking up employment elsewhere. Those issues must be addressed urgently and effectively.

Chemical and biological disarmament are also vital components of our global efforts. I need not dwell on the particulars or the unique importance of the chemical weapons convention. I echo the sentiments of the Secretary-General in expressing my fervent hope that you will face the challenges and successfully overcome the remaining obstacles during this session. For this Conference not to find agreement on an issue of such significance would be a major setback to the progress in international security achieved in the past few years. You have overcome too many obstacles in this long race to fail now.

A second area that demands new and creative thinking concerns conventional weaponry - a topic that for too long has been the orphan of our disarmament efforts. In certain respects, the global situation is not an auspicious one: the world is awash in surplus conventional arms and equipment as a result of disarmament measures in the demise of the cold war; meanwhile, high-technology weapons are in great demand in the aftermath of the Gulf war; and excessive production capacity in parts of the industrialized world is triggering an unseemly scramble for new markets.

Managing these trends will not be easy. Arms production and international transfers are core security concerns for many States - suppliers as well as recipients - and efforts to delineate between responsible and destabilizing arms transfers are bound to bring highly subjective judgements into play. Moreover, differing perspectives on the rights of self-defence versus the excessive accumulation of arms further complicate this issue. And yet, let us not surrender to undue pessimism. Cooperation on conventional arms restraint is both sensible and - more importantly - quite practicable.

There is, of course, the path of greater transparency. During the cold war, this confidence-building aspect was often dismissed as being inconsequential or, at best, a pale substitute for real reductions in arms. With hindsight, however, the intrinsic benefits of greater openness and transparency are more apparent to all. Steps toward transparency can help to dispel suspicions that are unfounded or based on worst-case threat perceptions. It is also logical that transparency should breed greater self-restraint, for in a situation of greater openness, threatening behaviour becomes harder to hide. I see openness and transparency as playing a much more important early-warning role for our collective security, which is emergent today and is becoming the most important part of a new world system, which is for me a "pax United Nations".

(Mr. Petrovsky, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs)

We at the United Nations are working diligently with governmental experts to develop procedures for the operation of the newly established Register of Conventional Arms. We are convinced that the Register, with further elaboration and adjustment, can help to foster a climate of voluntary restraint and provide a better basis for informed debate on ways and means to control conventional arms.

In this regard, I would also like to stress the importance we attach to the General Assembly's requests to this Conference to address the interrelated aspects of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms. Equally important are issues relating to the transfer of dual-use high technology and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. While the conceptual issues here are daunting, adopting measures designed to promote greater openness and transparency in these areas, in accordance with the existing legal instruments, would strengthen multilateral cooperation and promote greater predictability.

Another promising approach is that of regionally based limitations on conventional arms, such as those exemplified in the 1989 Esquipulas II accords among Central American States and the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. While the experience of one region is not necessarily applicable elsewhere, in the field of conventional weapons as in other security fields regional solutions to regional problems should be strongly promoted.

Ultimately, there cannot be truly effective conventional disarmament without an extensive redirection of defence industry capacity in many parts of the world. Many countries are in the throes of such a transition - it is a painful, disruptive process but one that is necessary for longer-term social well-being. While conversion is fundamentally a domestic matter, it has far-reaching international consequences. The economic and social problems are not easily nor quickly resolved, and in general, it seems to me, in the future agenda more attention should be paid to the complex of immediate post-disarmament measures, measures which we are supposed to undertake immediately as disarmament has become a fact of life. Thus, the international community should look closely at what it might do to play a greater supporting role.

A third area which concerns me greatly in my present capacity is the evolving relationship between States and international secretariats in the post-cold-war era. Anyone who looks at the United Nations today cannot fail to notice the substantial increase in the type of missions that international staff are being called upon to perform - be it in mediation, peace-keeping, weapons inspections, transitional assistance, election monitoring, or humanitarian relief, just to name a few.

The disarmament field is not immune to this trend. The new Secretary-General is keenly aware of the Secretariat's existing disarmament-related responsibilities, including fact-finding investigations into allegations of chemical weapons use and also in the enforcement area,

(Mr. Petrovsky, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs)

as in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 and subsequent resolutions. We are also watching closely ongoing developments, here and elsewhere, that could result in new institutional elaborations. The Secretariat has amply demonstrated its readiness to take on new tasks but to do so effectively we need to have mandates that are clear and achievable, and that bear some rational relation to the willingness of States to fund new or continuing missions. It is sadly ironic that multilateralism has re-entered the mainstream of disarmament activity at precisely a time of great financial uncertainty for the United Nations system as a whole.

Our respective interests suggest, above all, the need for candid ongoing dialogue. It is up to States, of course, to decide where and when they need assistance. We in the Secretariat wish to be a source of ideas and advice, where appropriate, and an active partner - I would like to stress, a partner - of States in promoting new approaches to disarmament and arms control and encouraging their consideration by Member States.

As I said at the outset of my remarks, it has been an honour and a pleasure to be present with you today. I wish to congratulate Mr. Vicente Berasategui on his recent appointment as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference. For my own part, I can assure you that the Office for Disarmament Affairs, under its Director, Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, will continue to promote disarmament with all the energy and professionalism that its resources permit. Personally, I shall follow the work of this Conference, as did my distinguished predecessor Under-Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi, with great interest. I also look forward to fruitful contacts in the future, and I count on very close cooperation with this important body headed by you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank you, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, for your statement and the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I am sure that the statement made by Mr. Petrovsky just now to the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in this phase of international relations relating to disarmament, will not fail to stimulate new initiatives and prompt greater cooperation among all countries to promote true disarmament. I now give the floor to the representative of Turkey, Mr. Arar.

Mr. ARAR (Turkey) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me to begin my statement by expressing my delegation's satisfaction at the way in which you have guided the work of this body, as President of the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative of Algeria, a country with which Turkey shares a common heritage and enjoys a friendship that is several centuries old.

(Mr. Arar, Turkey)

At its 66th plenary meeting, held on 9 December 1991, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a decision entitled "Transparency in armaments". Through this decision the General Assembly invited the Conference on Disarmament to elaborate universal practical means to enhance openness and transparency in the acquisition of conventional weapons as well as in the transfer of high technology for military purposes. The Conference on Disarmament was also invited by the General Assembly to insert the results of its work in this area in its annual report.

Turkey has always supported the concept of transparency in the military sphere. We consider that it is in itself a measure for building confidence that will reduce suspicions among States both regionally and internationally. Indeed, that is why my country supported the establishment in the United Nations of a standardized system of annual reporting on military budgets. It is also for that reason that Turkey co-sponsored the draft decision on transparency in armaments and, in order to bring about effectiveness and equality in the application of this decision, has spared no effort to ensure that its scope will be broadened to apply also to production. My delegation is of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament is the best forum to undertake the work which will contribute to making this decision universally applicable. We think that its experience makes it well placed to establish the necessary machinery to attain this end. In our opinion, in order to respond to the General Assembly's invitation the Conference must, first of all, include this item in its agenda and then set up an ad hoc committee on the issue. The establishment of a work programme and a timetable for this programme will be vital for the achievement of this purpose.

"Transparency in armaments" carries with it an idea of universality. It is a question that is of interest to all countries. Consequently, the ad hoc committee to be established for this purpose must of course proceed on the basis of an open-ended system of participation, that is to say open to all members and non-members of the Conference. My delegation considers that the ad hoc committee should not waste much time on procedural issues but start assessing measures that will bring about universal openness and transparency concerning arms proliferation, production and transfers. It will be essential for international machinery to monitor means of acquisition of weapons, including national production, to be devised in the ad hoc committee.

As a relatively new member of an observer delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, I must confess that I am somewhat surprised at the frequency with which reference is made to the "credibility" of this Conference. All too often I hear speakers say that the conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons will enhance the credibility of the Conference. That the rise in the number of observer countries - which in fact exceeds that of member countries - testifies to their interest in the work undertaken in this forum and enhances its credibility. I hear it said that the participation of eminent persons in these meetings contributes to its credibility. None of this is incorrect. Yet my delegation thinks that the true credibility of this body will be judged by the crowning of its efforts, and even more so by the

(Mr. Arar, Turkey)

quality of its work, the way and approach it follows to deal with the issues, its capacity to reformulate its agenda and restructure its membership in keeping with the new requirements that have appeared following the rapid evolution that our world has recently undergone. From this point of view too, "transparency in armaments" provides an opportunity that must be grasped as this issue deserves.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I also thank him for his reference to the historical links between his country and mine. I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Servais.

Mr. SERVAIS (Belgium) (translated from French): First of all, I would like to associate myself with the words of welcome you addressed to our colleagues from Japan and Great Britain, Ambassadors Tanaka and Weston. I wish them a happy stay among us and every success in their mission in Geneva. I would also like, on behalf of my delegation and the Western Group, to convey greetings to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, and to thank him sincerely for the important message he has communicated to us this morning. Now, with your permission, Mr. President, I will continue in English.

(continued in English)

The following statement is made on behalf of my own delegation and the delegations of Australia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States have taken note of the declaration of the representatives of the peoples of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro, of 27 April 1992, which states that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continues "the State, international legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". This declaration raises questions related to the continuity of Yugoslavia's membership of international organizations and conferences, including the Conference on Disarmament, which are under consideration. As a matter of fact, Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States have not accepted the automatic continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international organizations and conferences, including the Conference on Disarmament.

At this stage they reserve their position on this question and consider that the participation in the Conference on Disarmament of the delegation in question is without prejudice to future decisions which might be taken on this and related issues.

Mr. OGADA (Kenya): Mr. President, allow me to commend you for the manner in which you have been guiding our work during your presidency. I would also like to thank Ambassador Mutuale Kikanke of Zaire for having presided over the Conference effectively and efficiently during his tenure of office. My delegation, like many others, is happy to see Ambassador Vicente Berasategui as the new Secretary-General of the Conference, and believe that his vast experience and diplomatic skills may greatly contribute to the smooth functioning of this Conference. My delegation also would like to welcome the new Ambassadors to the Conference, including the most recently arrived Ambassadors of Japan and the United Kingdom, that is, Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka and Sir Michael Weston respectively. We look forward to working with them.

This morning the Conference is graced with the presence of Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in the United Nations in New York. We have listened with great attention to his statement.

Upon instructions from my Government I would like to state that the Kenya delegation would like to join all those delegations that support the appropriately named Australian initiative that was formally presented to the Conference by Senator Gareth Evans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, during the plenary meeting of the Conference held on Thursday, 19 March 1992 when the Senator presented the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons prepared by the Australian Government. This initiative once again underlines the commitment of the Australian Government in efforts to ban chemical weapons.

My delegation would like to commend the Australian Government for having single-handedly undertaken the monumental task of preparing a draft convention prohibiting chemical weapons which will undoubtedly enrich and accelerate the multilateral negotiations currently in progress in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

One of the stated objectives of the Australian initiative is to enable the Conference to conclude a convention prohibiting chemical weapons by 1992 as reflected in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My delegation, like all other delegations in the Conference, is bound by this limitation in which to conclude the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention which have been going on for a long time.

While the urgency to conclude the negotiations this year underlines the need to speed up the pace of negotiations, my delegation would like to state that speed should be coupled with caution to avoid stalling in the negotiations, as some of the remaining issues require clear and well-considered solutions. Some of the remaining problems which require careful attention are for example on routine verification of the chemical industry, challenge inspections, article XI on economic and technological development, the executive council and old and abandoned chemical weapons.

(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

Over the many years of negotiations we have come to be well aware of the positions of many delegations on the remaining issues. This year should not be the year in which to repeat positions which cannot contribute to compromise solutions. All delegations should work for a convention that protects the interests of all developed and developing countries, be they small, medium or large.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner, has a difficult task in guiding the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention towards the desired conclusion. He has appointed a committed and experienced team to assist him in his work, and my delegation supports all his endeavours, as well as those of the Chairman on the Working Group on Verification and the Friends of the Chair on the various issues under negotiation.

In conclusion I would like to thank the Australian Government for having presented this timely initiative which is an important contribution to the negotiations to achieve a convention banning chemical weapons, and I would also like to thank Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan for having personally visited Nairobi to discuss the Australian initiative with officials of the Kenya Government who assured him of the Government's support for this initiative which is compatible with Kenya's commitment to participate in all efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and specifically chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, I have asked the floor firstly to thank you and other distinguished Ambassadors for their most cordial words in welcoming me. I am aware that my predecessor, Ambassador Donowaki, has made a great contribution to the Conference on Disarmament, especially as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As a newcomer, I simply would like to express my wish to spare no efforts to make some contributions to the CD bearing in mind the critical juncture of CWC negotiation this year. I am also very aware that in this endeavour I shall have to depend on the guidance and cooperation of you, Mr. President, and other colleagues.

Furthermore, I would like to join previous speakers to express my appreciation of the presence today of His Excellency Ambassador Petrovsky, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, and I would like to thank him for his very important statement.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to make a brief statement concerning the question of continuity of Yugoslavia's membership in this forum. The Yugoslavian situation is still in flux and the question of its membership arises not only in this forum but in other international organizations. At this stage, my delegation would like to reserve its position on this question.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I will now give the floor to Mr. Ola Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who is to introduce the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test (GSETT-2) and the progress report on the Group's thirty-third session, issued as documents CD/1144 and CD/1145 respectively.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I regret that this report on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts earlier this spring is coming this late. I am however pleased to report today on the session by the Ad Hoc Group held from 2 to 13 March 1992 and attended by experts and representatives from 25 countries and to introduce documents CD/1144 containing the Group's sixth main report and CD/1145 containing the Group's progress report.

I have on earlier occasions reported to the Conference on the results of the Group's second large-scale technical test, usually referred to as GSETT-2, and I will today only briefly summarize the results presented in CD/1144. During the Group's next session a number of appendices to this report will be compiled, containing detailed technical and scientific material.

The development of any advanced technical system is a dynamic process, in which proposed technical concepts are tested in practical experiments and the system design is modified according to the experience thus gained. The Ad Hoc Group has since its very beginning followed this principle in its development of a global seismological verification system.

The first global system was designed in 1978 (CCD/558), and was based on the exchange of pre-analysed "level I" data only. This system, which provided for the exchange of only limited amounts of data, was tested in the Group's first large-scale experiment, which we usually refer to as GSETT-1, in 1984 (CD/720).

Based on the experiences of that test and utilizing the rapid scientific and techological development, inter alia in information technology, the Ad Hoc Group effected a comprehensive redesign of the system. The modernized system, presented in 1989 (CD/903), was a system based on the exchange of wave-form data on all detected signals - "level II data" - and the routine analysis of this large data volume at international data centres.

The purpose of the recent test of GSETT-2 was to test the methods and procedures developed by the Group, going beyond what is routinely used for scientific purposes. The test was carried out in four phases: a first phase where experimental facilities and procedures were established around the world; a second phase where a number of short-term preparatory tests were conducted. The third phase was the full-scale test where the entire experimental system was operated continuously for 49 consecutive days from

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

late April to early June 1991. Thirty-four countries participated in this main phase providing data from in all 60 seismological stations located in all continents. The individual countries and their national data centres were linked by modern means of communication to one or more of the four experimental international data centres operated in Canberra, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington, D.C.

The fourth phase, the evaluation of the test, is still continuing. Report CD/1144 summarizes the technical and operational results gained so far. In addition, a unique seismological database has been compiled during the test, which will be of interest to the wider seismological scientific community. Thanks to efforts by the United States delegation all data collected during GSETT-2 are now easily and generally available on two CD discs. This in itself is an illustration of the dramatic technological development, where data volumes which could barely be handled by the most advanced computers of yesterday can today be stored on CD discs and be analysed on personal computers available to all of us. This also illustrates the need to continuously update and modernize the global seismological system. In a broader perspective it stresses the need that modern technology be fully utilized also in support of arms limitation and disarmament efforts.

The GSETT-2 has provided the Group with most valuable results and experiences which will form a basis for reassessing the design of the system proposed in 1989 (CD/903). Such a reassessment, which will take into account also recent scientific, technological and other developments, will be reported on during the spring session of 1993.

Now that the main phase of GSETT-2 is successfully completed I would like to pay tribute in particular to some of my collaborators. Mr. Peter Basham of Canada has made a most valuable contribution as Coordinator of the Test. Dr. Frode Ringdal, Norway, the Groups Scientific Secretary, has as always successfully carried the responsibility of compiling our reports. The Group Secretary, Mr. Cassandra, and the secretariat here in Geneva have done excellent work not only in supporting the Group during its session but also in the preparation and translation of the report. The Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop by the United States in Dallas, Texas, from 3 to 5 December 1991, to assist in the evaluation of the results of GSETT-2. The Australian delegation has recently hosted a workshop in Canberra to evaluate the seismological method used at experimental international data centres.

The Ad Hoc Group continued its discussions on future work remaining under its current mandate. As I have just mentioned the next step in the dynamic process of developing the system is to analyse the implications for the present system design of the results obtained in GSETT-2 and of recent scientific, technological and other developments. This reassessment of the existing system design is likely to highlight certain issues and the Group tentatively identified a number that deserve careful attention in the Group's future work. I will comment briefly on some of these issues.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The seismological station, the sensor, is the most critical component of a global seismological verification system. The technical quality of the stations, their proper siting at locations with good receiving conditions and an appropriate global distribution of the stations are fundamental to obtain a capable system. The Ad Hoc Group considers that the further development and testing of a standardized seismological station, usually referred to as a CD station, to be used worldwide, is an important future task. An interesting option in this context is the possibility of introducing the "open station" concept by which data are made easily available by remotely accessing the computer systems of the individual stations. The selection of sites for seismological stations all over the globe and the deployment of experimental stations to conduct test recordings would provide information of great importance for the design of a global system. Studies of alternative global networks and estimates of their expected capabilities would be another important task. Such studies should include also estimates of operating and investment costs.

The present concept of a global system includes four experimental international data centres, and four such experimental centres have also been utilized in the two main tests. Recent developments have made it interesting, however, to study the feasibility of reducing the number of international data centres and maybe go as far as having only one.

The Ad Hoc Group regards continued testing on a bilateral and multilateral basis with the widest possible global participation as an essential element also in its future work. The Ad Hoc Group plans to continue the discussion of its future work, including the incorporation of new technologies, at its next session.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 27 July to 7 August 1992.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Ola Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, for introducing the reports issued as CD/1144 and CD/1145. Following the customary practice, I will submit to the Conference for adoption at the plenary meeting scheduled for Thursday 21 May the recommendation appearing in paragraph 11 of the progress report. The recommendation set out in paragraph 11 relates to the date of the Ad Hoc Group's next session, which, as Mr. Ola Dahlman has just announced, is to be held between 27 July and 7 August 1992. The Conference will also take note of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test (GSETT-2), contained in document CD/1144.

At this point in our work I now give the floor to Ambassador Batsanov, the representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. BATSANOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I would like to express my satisfaction at the way you are leading us in our work and congratulate our new colleagues, Ambassador Tanaka from Japan and Sir Michael Weston from the United Kingdom. I would like to make a very brief comment and a short observation in connection with the statement made by Mr. Petrovsky, the Under-Secretary-General, not just to note, so to speak, the importance of what he said, but also to express one thought on it.

Geneva contains a concentration, an accumulation, of what one might call significant disarmament expertise on the part of States, and thus it is a fine thing that the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat finds it possible to inform us of its ideas and, I hope, also become acquainted with the thinking of Government representatives entrusted with disarmament negotiations. I think this is particularly important in a situation where the United Nations apparatus is being reformed in order to bring it up to date and adapt it, so to speak, to new conditions and the move to a new level of work. Naturally, I speak on behalf of the Russian delegation, but I think others too will be interested in the development of a new partnership with the part of the United Nations Secretariat which deals with disarmament issues, in order for the partnership to be mutually beneficial and to help solve the basic questions facing us in the field of disarmament. It is on a note of hope, so to speak, for the development of such a partnership that I would like to conclude.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Batsanov, the representative of the Russian Federation, for his statement and the suggestions prompted by the remarks of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky. The representative of Yugoslavia has asked to speak at this stage in our work. I give him the floor.

Mr. CALOVSKI (Yugoslavia): I would also like to welcome most warmly the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Petrovsky, a friend of many of us, and to note his important statement and his eagerness to help our Conference. I would also like to welcome our new colleagues from the United Kingdom and Japan, wishing them all the best and success in their mission.

I am certain, Mr. President, that you will agree with me that this is not the right place nor the right time to discuss the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, in connection with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Belgium, Ambassador Servais, on behalf of some members of the Western Group, and the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka, it is my duty to make the following brief statement.

The Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, at its session held on 27 April 1992, promulgated the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under this Constitution, strictly respecting the continuity of the international

(Mr. Calovski, Yugoslavia)

personality of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will continue to fulfil all the rights conferred on, and obligations assumed by, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international relations, including its membership in all international organizations and its participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugoslavia.

So I would like to assure you, Mr. President, that Yugoslavia will continue without prejudice or reservations its very active profile in the CD, and will endeavour to make a constructive and positive contribution, as it has been doing so far.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Calovski, the representative of Yugoslavia, for his statement. I would now like to take up other matters on our agenda. Today the secretariat has distributed a draft decision relating to the request for participation in our work submitted by the Philippines, Mauritius and the United Republic of Tanzania. The draft decision is contained in document CD/WP.426, containing a note from the President. No objections were raised when the communications from the Philippines, Mauritius and the United Republic of Tanzania were distributed. I therefore suggest that we adopt the draft decision directly in plenary. May I consider that the Conference adopts document CD/WP.426? I see no objections.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Today we were supposed to hold an informal meeting on the substance of item 3 of the agenda, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, since the members of the Conference have accepted the kind invitation extended by the Government of Austria to consider the proposal that Vienna should be the seat of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, I feel it appropriate to postpone our work on this agenda item to Thursday, 21 May. I see no objections.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The secretariat has also distributed today the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies scheduled for next week. The timetable was drawn up in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, and as usual it is purely indicative and can be changed as necessary. I would like to emphasize that in accordance with this timetable, immediately after the plenary meeting on Thursday, 21 May, the Conference will hold the informal meeting on item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". On that understanding I propose that we adopt this informal paper. I see no objections; the paper is adopted.

(The President)

There are no other questions to take up today, but before I adjourn the meeting I would like to inform you that at our next plenary the first speaker will be the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, His Excellency Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 21 May at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.621
21 May 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 21 May 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdelhamid Semichi (Algeria)

GE.92-61508/4578B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 621st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I will submit today to the Conference for decision, once we have come to the end of the list of speakers, the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events concerning the dates scheduled for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, that is to say from 27 July to 7 August 1992. I will then invite the Conference to take note of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test (GSETT-2). Also as announced at the 620th plenary meeting, we will hold today, immediately after this meeting, an informal meeting that will be devoted to the substance of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Algeria, Germany, Senegal and South Africa. In keeping with the tradition that has been established in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the President has been entrusted with the task of presenting a biographical sketch of the eminent person who, in special circumstances, is participating in the work of this body. Today, without departing from that tradition, and without hiding my quite justifiable emotion, I have the honour and great pleasure of introducing to you His Excellency Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.

Following the important responsibilities entrusted to him during Algeria's liberation struggle, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi devoted himself at an early stage to mobilizing support for the Algerian cause, which he had the task of and which were explaining, promoting and defending in all the forums of the nascent and already united third world. From New Delhi to Jakarta, via Bandung, and then from Belgrade to Cairo - all these milestones that evoke the history of the peoples of the third world - Mr. Brahimi was more attached than most to the emergence of the Afro-Asian movement and the non-aligned countries, a movement that was subsequently to leave its incontestable mark on a whole period of contemporary history. As Algerian Ambassador in Cairo and then in London, Mr. Brahimi, following independence, succeeded in contributing tirelessly to the promotion of Algeria and its diplomacy internationally. As Deputy Secretary-General of the Arab League, he devoted all his commitment and his solidarity to the national reconciliation effort in Lebanon and the quest for solutions to the particularly complex problems facing the Middle East.

You will understand that the discretion imposed upon me by my office compels me to stop this biographical outline here. Hence, I would like to welcome His Excellency Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, among us on your behalf and in my capacity as President of the Conference, and without further delay I now give him the floor.

Mr. BRAHIMI (Algeria) (translated from French): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for the kind and quite undeserved words which you were so kind as to address to me. In my turn I would like to say how honoured I feel at being able to speak to you today.

(Mr. Brahimi, Algeria)

More than a decade ago, Algeria had the privilege of inaugurating the work of this Conference, the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament which was created by the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Let us acknowledge frankly that after all these years the Conference has not yet recorded any concrete achievements that are commensurate with the hopes and aspirations placed in it by the international community. Whereas in recent times it was easy to ascribe this lack of progress in disarmament to the bipolar international climate, today there is less reason why the improvement in this climate should not be reflected in multilateral disarmament bodies so as to allow them to regain their proper place at last.

It is just as reasonable to expect that the drive which could be seen in recent Soviet-American negotiations should be transmitted to the work of this Conference. This clearly offers an opportunity to reaffirm the necessary complementarity between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations. Because if we are to promote a climate which will be truly conducive to the search for common peace and security, bilateral negotiations cannot replace multilateral efforts. Indeed, if there is one area where the "shared destiny" of mankind and civilization really makes itself felt, it is precisely when we face the threat of a nuclear apocalypse which, through a levelling process of total destruction, would wipe out all peoples without distinction, whether or not they were involved in the conflicts giving rise to such a terrifying global catastrophy. For several years now we have noted with great concern the downgrading of the order of priorities as recognized and identified by the international community. And it is a special source of regret in this regard to note the total absence, within the Conference on Disarmament, of any negotiations to date on nuclear matters.

The negotiations on the convention to ban chemical weapons provide a source of great satisfaction which contrasts all the more with the frustration which we rightly feel as we look at the results of work on the other items on the agenda. We would like to express the wish that these negotiations will be completed this year and that, as a result, nuclear matters will be able to regain their place among the urgent priority tasks which the Conference on Disarmament must tackle. Despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly calling on the Conference to embark without delay on structured negotiations on nuclear questions, with a view to concluding one or more international agreements on nuclear weapons, it has not been possible for the commitments entered into at the very moment when the Conference was created to be honoured. Our concern is all the greater since, by a strange paradox, the Conference seems to be agreeing to abandon the fundamental theme of disarmament policy and relinquish its original mission of warding off the nuclear peril. This concern takes on its full relevance as we approach the deadline of 1995 for the holding of a review conference of decisive importance for the future of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The failure of the fourth NPT review conference, and in particular the reasons behind that failure, should be borne in mind during the period running from now to that important date.

(Mr. Brahimi, Algeria)

It is, in the first place, high time to honour the commitments entered into under that Treaty by the nuclear States, involving, in particular, the negotiation of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, such as the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In the same way, it is equally appropriate for those States that have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option to benefit in return, in a legally binding international instrument, from guarantees against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons. And finally, it remains important to guarantee equal access for all to nuclear technology in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy for development.

Another question of concern to the international community today deserves to be included in the agenda of the Conference. I am referring to the question of transparency in armaments. This is a subject of interest on a variety of grounds to all the members of the international community without exception, whether they be producers, exporters, importers, users or - especially - potential victims of these weapons. However, consideration of this question will remain incomplete as long as it is not broadened in scope to cover fundamental issues hitherto not covered in the General Assembly resolution on the subject. I have in mind in particular the inclusion of the dimension of arms production, and the same applies to the stockpiling and transfer of the related high technologies. Thus transparency has to be extended to weapons of mass destruction, and in particular to nuclear weapons which most dangerously threaten international peace and security.

In considering this question, due account should be taken of the security imperatives specific to each region, and its defence needs. There is also a need to have a serious look at the reasons, very often legitimate ones, for the arms build-up in certain parts of the world which are also keen on peace and security but which for decades now have been suffering from devastating conflicts which they did not seek and which require above all a political settlement. The Conference on Disarmament seems to us to be the most appropriate organ to consider this subject. This will also provide an opportunity for the international community to show its confidence in the CD, by reinstating it in its proper calling in the field of disarmament negotiations.

Mention of the reinstatement of the Conference on Disarmament in its original calling brings me to what we keenly hope will become the first concrete and long-awaited achievement in the history of this Conference. I am referring to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which will be the first truly multilateral disarmament instrument, putting an end to a whole category of particularly devastating and murderous weapons under international control. It is essential for the convention on chemical weapons to be added to the Conference on Disarmament's list of achievements this year. This will be a harbinger of the solutions of the other issues on the agenda of the Conference, in particular those relating to nuclear and space issues.

(Mr. Brahimi, Algeria)

Algeria has always been, and remains, in favour of a total ban on chemical weapons and their use. Algeria is not developing and does not produce chemical weapons, and it is not seeking to acquire them. My country remains profoundly convinced that the best way to curb the threat of these weapons is to banish them once and for all, by means of this international convention. In this regard, it will be Algeria's honour and duty to be among the original signatories.

We see this convention as global in scope, universal in membership and non-discriminatory in application. It should in no way be a non-proliferation-type treaty, nor should it constitute an obstacle of any kind to the development of the chemical industry, the transfer of technology or international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemistry. In order for it to be universal and truly acceptable for those States which, like mine, do not possess chemical weapons, the future convention must contain clear and explicit provisions on assistance to be provided to States parties that fall victim to the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. Assistance must be automatic and not linked to considerations which would make it selective. It is true that this instrument is, first and foremost, a disarmament agreement relevant to the security of all States. However, nobody can deny that as stocks of chemical weapons are destroyed under international control, and as the civilian chemical industry has to be subjected to close and continuous surveillance, cooperation in this area has become a vital necessity, in particular for developing countries. And it was the very lack of an international instrument prohibiting chemical weapons and controlling their proliferation which, in the view of some people, justified in the past the institution of an unofficial regime to control the export of certain chemicals known to be toxic. It would be impossible today, and even less tomorrow, as the future convention enters into force, to accept the existence of a dual control regime for States parties. To this end, all existing discriminatory restrictions in the field of the chemical industry will have to be removed. It also seems to us that the verification regime provided for under the convention in its twin dimension of routine verification and challenge verification will be effective in deterring any use for purposes not permitted by the convention.

We appreciate the importance of the outstanding problems; we also appreciate, and in the same way, how much work has already been done. At the present stage of negotiations, only real political will, which is in fact essential, based on a spirit of mutual compromise, will allow us to overcome the actually rather limited number of difficulties which still remain on the most controversial political questions. Although it may carry with it many implications for the chemical industry, in the view of this delegation the future convention fundamentally remains a security treaty for the whole of the international community. Because of this, it is essential for its multilateral dimension to predominate and, consequently, to take equal account of all legitimately expressed concerns.

We believe that the executive body of the future convention should represent the international community as a whole. To achieve this, only equitable geographical distribution as between the various regions of the

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world will be able to secure acceptance by one and all. Clearly, each region will have to take due account of the industrial criterion as it selects its own representatives. Bearing in mind the multilateral dimension of the future convention, the executive council must be given a prime role in the implementation and application of the convention where article IX is concerned. This role is all the more essential and important since this area will involve concerns related to non-compliance. Because although they may be unilateral at the outset, these concerns will certainly come to be concerns for the States parties as a whole, mainly because of the stakes involved in non-compliance with the convention as regards the security of all States.

Allow me to reiterate once again our hope that this phase of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention will be completed successfully, to allow the Conference to be proud of its success in this area and to seize the opportunities provided by the major changes which have occurred in the world in order to continue its work. The Algerian delegation, I need hardly add, will spare no effort to continue making its own modest contribution to the common endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria for his important statement. I now wish to welcome warmly to the Conference the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany, His Excellency Ambassador Dr. Josef Holik, who is visiting us for the first time today. I would like to thank Ambassador Holik for the interest he attaches to our work and to wish him every possible success in his mission in Geneva. I am sure that the Conference will follow his statement very carefully. I now call on His Excellency the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany, Ambassador Dr. Josef Holik.

Mr. HOLIK (Germany): Mr. President, thank you for your kind words of welcome. It is a particular honour for me to address this Conference after His Excellency Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Foreign Minister of Algeria, a country which plays an active role in the negotiations on chemical weapons. I listened with particular interest to his speech as it expressed a strong commitment of the Algerian Government to conclude the negotiations on chemical weapons this year, an undertaking which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany fully shares.

Let me thank you, Sir, on behalf of the German Government, for the efforts you and your delegation have invested during your term of presidency. The German delegation highly appreciates what you have done in support of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador von Wagner. In addition, your delegation as coordinator for chemical weapons during this year has greatly contributed to the smooth and harmonized cooperation between the groups and between the Group of 21 and the bureau of the Chairman. We also appreciate your efforts to promote progress on other important topics on the CD agenda which you dealt with in your speech.

Being in Geneva at the beginning of the second session of this year's Conference on Disarmament gives me great satisfaction. I think we are all aware this is a crucial moment in the history of the CD. The next few months

(Mr. Holik, Germany)

will show whether the intense and fruitful work which you, Mr. President, and your predecessors have invested for many years in these negotiations will make it possible to fulfil finally the task given to the CD by the General Assembly of the United Nations: to achieve an agreement on a CW convention by 1992 and to report this result to the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

Our political leaders have committed themselves to this aim. The responsibility for achieving it is mainly on the shoulders of those around this table. This responsibility goes beyond negotiating an international agreement that meets specific security interests of the participating States. The members of this Conference have been entrusted by the United Nations with the task of finding a common solution to a fundamental challenge: the spread of weapons of mass destruction. A lasting solution for this task requires cooperation between all members of the community of nations, based upon a global and reliably verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

The CW convention under negotiation in this Conference is indispensable not only as an instrument for suppressing a particularly inhumane category of weapons of mass destruction, but also as a model of cooperative security - a pattern of international behaviour - to which the future belongs. The successful conclusion of a CW convention will therefore be a breakthrough for global disarmament and for international diplomacy. It will disprove those who have doubted the qualification of the CD as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, comprising representation from all geographical regions.

Before we conclude our common task, we still have to go through an intensive final phase of the negotiations. Let me deal with some of the issues we still have to tackle. I am pleased to hear that intensive open-ended consultations by the Chairman have prepared the ground for answers to the open questions of challenge inspections. A "vision" by the Chairman as now contained in WP.400 is meant to contribute to this process even further. I am glad that this vision seems to find broad support, as the challenge inspection regime constitutes a central pillar of the CW convention.

Industry verification must give a reasonable assurance that chemical industries in all States parties to the future CW convention are used only for purposes not prohibited. The chemical industry, as we all know, is an important factor in the economy of many countries, including my own. Thus, industry verification must neither inhibit nor hamper normal activities contributing to the well-being and development of the economy of a particular State. Germany fully supports this philosophy while, at the same time, asking for the broadest coverage of chemical industry possible under the CW convention. This appears to be the best way of protecting the chemical industry against charges of non-compliance. The position is not only supported by our own chemical industry but by many chemical industry associations throughout the world.

(Mr. Holik, Germany)

The industry verification regime will be unique of its kind. It will contribute to openness and transparency on a global scale unprecedented before. The regime may be complex in its implications but it should remain easy to implement. Particularly in the latter regard, additional efforts might be necessary.

Another issue of particular importance is that the CW convention does not leave any loopholes for circumvention. Therefore, we are particularly pleased that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances has been established under article 1 of the draft convention. However, additional questions emerged in the context of the definition of chemical weapons. Germany remains committed to a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, while, at the same time, acknowledging that certain disabling chemicals might have to be used under specific circumstances. We urge all delegations to find a solution which would not endanger the credibility of the most important element of the CW convention, the total ban on chemical weapons.

Another major goal is to rid the world of all existing stocks of chemical weapons. Declared stocks have to be destroyed within a limited time frame. These provisions must be feasible in particular for the major stock holders. We recognize the difficulties linked with such provisions, but we insist that solutions must be readily available in order not to delay the conclusion of the CW convention this year. In this context, we support the idea to involve the executive council, should the order of destruction for exceptional reasons need to be reconsidered.

In our view, the overall objective of the CW convention is to strengthen international security. Destroying existing CW stocks, closing down former CW production facilities and verifying non-production of chemical weapons are its essential elements. However, in the context of old and abandoned chemical weapons additional problems arise. Old stocks which can no longer be used for military purposes do not pose a security risk. They must be considered as toxic waste. Of course, we are all interested to liberate this planet from all kinds of ecological burdens. But the CW convention as a security agreement cannot fulfil this task. On balance, the solution proposed by Ambassador Brotodiningrat for old chemical weapons produced before 1925 as well as for those produced before 1946 represents in our view a reasonable compromise on this issue.

With regard to abandoned chemical weapons a delicate balance has to be struck between the obligations of the territorial and the abandoning State. The convention must provide for language that is sufficiently clear to ensure destruction of the abandoned chemical weapons in the interest of all States parties and that includes the necessary flexibility given the differing historical background of specific cases. It remains our view that specific cases can best be solved bilaterally. This should be reflected in the text of the convention.

I have already stressed the importance of the civilian chemical industry. For many nations its contribution to economic and technological development is very important. Many countries have expressed their interest

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that national export control measures designed to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons should be removed following the institution of the CW convention. I recognize the logic of this position. We are convinced that a cooperative approach to fight proliferation of chemical weapons worldwide is the only effective long-term strategy to achieve this goal. However, nobody can expect the CW convention to function smoothly and prefectly right from the first day after entering into force. The degree to which verification measures of the convention can be implemented and the confidence this creates will, in my mind, be the criterion against which the necessity of auxiliary national non-proliferation measures has to be judged. No country will continue national measures when it feels that international cooperation through the CW convention does the job already. So the success of our common endeavours will determine when this point will be reached. In my view, the provisions proposed by the Friend of the Chair charged with this question provide a sound basis for agreement.

There might have been some doubts still in February whether the CD would be able to conclude its work on the CW convention this year. These doubts, it seems to me, have disappeared. Thanks to the joint efforts of all delegations, the CW convention is really within reach.

Two months ago, the CD experienced an important moment when Foreign Minister Evans of Australia and other speakers addressed the future of these negotiations. The resolution and the momentum which one could witness then have led to braod agreement between CD delegations and to the intensification of the CW negotiations. Representing the country of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I am grateful for the support for the proposals which Ambassador von Wagner, at the request of the CD, has laid out in WP.394.

The "draft convention" presented by the Chairman and his bureau in WP.400 opens the way to the timely conclusion of the CW negotiations. A number of issues still have to be settled before an un-bracketed "Chairman's draft" can be presented around mid-June, as indicated in WP.394. This "Chairman's draft" will aspire to take all views into account and try to be as fair to the positions of all partners as is possible. Naturally, compromises must also have the best interests of the convention in mind. It would help none of us to agree to provisions which turn out to be unable to fulfil their purpose.

I am prepared, if necessary, to face personally the views and the judgement of your Governments and to explain the "Chairman's draft". Of course, changes and amendments will not be impossible at this point. However, given the balanced nature the text will aspire to, this then will have to be on a "give and take" basis, not attempts to shift the balance in one's own favour.

The German Government is committed to the goal of a CW convention which will secure universal acceptance, but I am convinced that States represented here share this commitment. The major prerequisite for universality is consensus on the draft convention here in the CD. One of the very few instructions which Ambassador von Wagner has received from Bonn is to try his

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utmost to achieve a CW convention supported by all member States of the CD. I am giving you this confidential piece of information because Ambassador von Wagner will need your support; and I am confident he will receive it. However, we have obligated ourselves in the CD mandate to reach a result this year. We could not afford to be held hostage in this effort by a theoretically possible minute minority of determined objectors.

The result we strive for is the broadest possible adherence to the CW convention. This could be achieved by a consensus of the Conference on Disarmament and the transmittal of the text to New York, where it will then draw hopefully unanimous support by the General Assembly. Only the General Assembly of the United Nations representing all peoples of the world can provide the political endorsement which this most comprehensive and politically important arms control treaty deserves. Following endorsement of our common text at the United Nations General Assembly, a signing conference in Paris towards the end of the year should enable as many nations as possible to give the convention the universality it needs and deserves. This will lead us then to the start of the work of the preparatory commission in early 1993.

This of course is a glimpse beyond our immediate work. I feel, however, that it is important not to lose sight of the objectives we want to see transferred into binding international standards.

I am convinced: together we can achieve what we have been working for for so long.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank his Excellency the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany for his important statement and his kind words to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Senegal, Ambassador Alioune Sene.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all, since I am taking the floor for the first time during this session of the Conference on Disarmament, to express very sincerely my warmest congratulations to you and say how proud we are to see a worthy son of Africa preside over our Conference. This function that you are performing with the competence of an experienced diplomat consequently honours us on several accounts. And how can I find words for your neighbour the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, my friend Lakhdar Brahimi, whose excellent presentation before this august assembly is unequaled save by the scope and prestige of his very brilliant diplomatic career, of which you, Mr. President, vouchsafed us a number of praiseworthy sequences? I would also like to pay tribute to the very significant contribution made by Dr. Josef Holik, the German Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, who shed the light of an industrialized country on the thinking behind the convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, and did so in a substantive and substantial way. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Berasategui on taking up his new functions and pay tribute to his predecessor, Ambassador Komatina, for the distinguished services that he rendered to the United Nations.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Likewise I wish to make use of the opportunity I have been offered to address all our thanks to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for his brilliant introductory statement of 14 May 1992 on the international political situation and the role that should be played by the United Nations, in the present context, in order to promote international peace and security. As he pointed out so well in his statement, the contours of international security have radically changed. In fact, the end of the cold war and the start of arms reductions have placed the question of disarmament in a totally different perspective. Rather than being perceived from the viewpoint of balance between the two super-Powers, arms control and disarmament are increasingly recognized as constituents of a programme of international security in which the issues should be addressed from the point of view of preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping. In order to do this, the role of the United Nations, and in particular the Conference on Disarmament, cannot but be fundamental. This is why my delegation welcomed very favourably and supports Mr. Petrovsky's assertion that we must not remain prisoners of the past. For the challenge of change is upon us and we should respond to it by taking into consideration, this time, the conceptual basis of the disarmament process. We have no choice but to recognize that, under present trends, resort to multilateral action to deal with threats to international peace and security is becoming more and more important.

Moreover, Mr. President, in your first statement as President of this Conference, you broached this question brilliantly by stating that whereas efforts were made in the past to attribute the lack of progress in multilateral disarmament to an often unfavourable international climate, today there are grounds to hope that, given the new circumstances, multilateral bodies will recover their proper place and at last take up their universal mission in the service of disarmament. 1992 could then see the establishment of the first genuinely multilateral disarmament instrument which will put an end to the existence of an entire category of particularly devastating and murderous weapons, namely chemical weapons. Thanks to such a fine achievement, we hope that the United Nations, through our Conference, the only organ responsible for disarmament negotiations, would be seeing its original purpose reinstated. Its responsibility, in this field, would then no longer be reduced to the passive role which, for decades, has confined it to the simple function of recording agreements concluded outside it. But, as the entire international community has recognized, progress on these disarmament issues can be made only if a minimum level of confidence and transparency can be guaranteed in the mastery of arms control. Whether these be weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons.

In that connection, the decision adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1991, entitled "Transparency in armaments", is most encouraging. Through this decision, the General Assembly invites the Conference on Disarmament to elaborate universal practical means to enhance openness and transparency in the acquisition of conventional weapons as well as in the transfer of high technology for military purposes. On this point, my delegation naturally subscribes to the view expounded by certain countries, namely that any system devised for this purpose will be insufficient and inadequate as long as its scope is not extended to include, inter alia, the

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production of these weapons and the extension of this transparency to weapons of mass destruction, and more particularly nuclear weapons, as the Minister from Algeria has just emphasized. From this point of view, we listened with great interest to the argument put forward on 14 May 1992 by the representative of Turkey, who focused his statement on the important issue of transparency. We consider, as he does, that this concept is in itself a measure for building confidence that will reduce suspicions among States both regionally and internationally.

My delegation therefore endorses the proposal that has been made requesting the Conference on Disarmament first of all to place this issue on its agenda and then to set up an ad hoc committee to study it. Moreover, the recent creation in the United Nations of a standardized system for annual reporting of States' military budgets is also conducive to confidence-building and transparency. Consequently, we are happy to note, as was stated by the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, that the United Nations is working hard with government experts to develop procedures for the effective implementation of this standardized system in the shape of the United Nations Register.

Another subject that I would like to address is that of chemical weapons. I have already had occasion to say before this Conference how much my country, Senegal, is in favour of a ban that would make chemical weapons illegal and prohibit their use. The position of the Government of the Republic of Senegal remains unchanged and is based on the principle that the future convention, while protecting civil chemical industry and encouraging international cooperation in the area of the peaceful uses of chemical products, should, first and foremost, provide for the total destruction of present stockpiles and ban the use of these weapons. In order to do this, it must be universal and non-discriminatory. My delegation fully appreciates the extent of the work already accomplished by the Conference in this area. This is why I would particularly like to pay tribute to the dedication and competence with which Ambassador Adolf von Wagner of Germany, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has been discharging his mission, and to assure him of the full cooperation and the constant readiness of my delegation to help him in his difficult task.

For all that, the Senegalese delegation is aware of the problems that have yet to be solved. But it remains convinced that we will achieve the aim of finalizing a convention this year if all those involved in the negotiations abide by this commitment by carrying out meaningful and pragmatic talks and demonstrating fully their political will. It goes without saying, as was stated by my colleague from Kenya in his statement on 14 May, that this desire to conclude a convention come what may before the end of 1992 should go hand in hand with a degree of caution because the outstanding questions deserve clear and well-thought-out solutions, especially in the area of verification of the chemical industry, inspections, the executive council and article XI on economic and technological development. Most certainly, with the necessary political will we shall of course be able to overcome these difficulties. This is what the entire international community expects from our Conference. We must not disappoint it.

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Before concluding I would like to report to our Conference that on 4 May 1992, the President of the Republic of Senegal, His Excellency Mr. Abdou Diouf, in his capacity as Chairman of the Summit-level Group for South-South consultation and cooperation, also known as the Group of 15 or G.15, published a G.15 position paper on the new world order. In the part of that document devoted to disarmament and development, the G.15 heads of State and government state:

> "The process of disarmament should be linked to the process of development and the fostering of global security in its most comprehensive form. Developing countries will endeavour to encourage the process of disarmament globally and regionally, conscious of the necessity to channel the maximum resources for developmental purposes. Moreover, real resources being released at present as a result of lower global military spending, should be diverted for the economic and social development of developing countries.
>
> "The continuing trend towards disarmament resulting from the end of East-West confrontation, the reduction of military expenditures and the progressive reduction of international tensions should make it possible to extract a 'peace dividend' in the form of financial and technical resources, for the enhancement of international development cooperation.
>
> "Appropriate structures or bodies should be established to implement this process and the creation of an international fund within the framework of the United Nations, represents the best way of channelling resources freed as a result of disarmament for the purposes of development."

In any event the end of the cold war and the profound changes generated by the upheavals as well as the Earth-shaking serious events have shown us quite clearly that this is not "the end of history". Thus a new world order conceived in the light of current reality and new ideas should be instituted by accommodating the interests of all nations, both large and small, in the area of disarmament and the establishment of a universal system of common security. It is no secret that war is still being waged in various parts of the world and reminds us painfully that, to be fully effective, the development process should focus not only on the reduction of existing stockpiles, but also on the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. Hence the need to create the means to prevent armed conflicts wherever international security is threatened. It is also necessary to establish reliable and effective mechanisms designed to promote transparency and confidence, as further measures that would favour international security and reduce the volume of weapons. Moreover, because of the worldwide scale of economic markets and technologies, the globalization and interdependence of disarmament problems, even though security questions have national and regional aspects, they also have an international dimension that cannot be denied.

Hence the importance conferred on the United Nations by its efforts to set up a new equilibrium in security matters through specific negotiations and agreements on arms control and disarmament. Of course, these negotiations

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cannot be separated from the other part of the international agenda devoted to dialogue on cooperation for development and the environment with a view to reducing the disparities in economic wealth and the structural imbalances between North and South in order to respond to the political and legal imperatives of a changing world. However extensive the role of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly in the building of the new world order, the Conference on Disarmament, as a multilateral negotiating body, has a major contribution to make, as its agenda attests, to reduce the nuclear threat, prevent an arms race in space, eliminate radiological weapons and promote work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Especially as the Conference stands on the threshold of an unprecedented event, as you emphasized yourself just now, Sir, with the convention on chemical weapons which will doubtless mark the establishment of the most comprehensive system for security and cooperation in the history of disarmament.

As to the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, this is one of the most burning security issues of our time. In this connection, the recent accession of a number of States to the non-proliferation Treaty, and the conclusion by other States of various agreements on nuclear safeguards with IAEA, are positive elements which reconfirm our view that it is necessary to strengthen the non-proliferation regime of which the NPT is the fundamental pillar. Senegal, for its part, is firmly in favour of the extension of the NPT at the review conference in 1995. The growing interest that many States are showing in establishing in their respective regions denuclearized zones or zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is a sign of good will and commitment to disarmament which deserves the support of the international community.

This is also the place to recall that at its summit held in Cairo in 1964, the Organization of African Unity adopted a declaration making Africa a denuclearized zone, and we are happy that the Government of South Africa, which was not present, but whose efforts to dismantle apartheid we are following with interest today, has agreed to submit its atomic plants to IAEA checks. It is also understood that despite the differences of opinion on time-frames, the banning of nuclear tests is first and foremost an essential stage in mankind's march towards a denuclearized world. But in the meantime there is a need to devise effective legal arrangements which would offer non-nuclear-weapon States guarantees against the use or threat of use of these weapons. This is also the place and the moment to welcome the impetus given by the important INF, CFE and START treaties and by certain unilateral measures announced by nuclear Powers which quite obviously enhance the scope for multilateral negotiation.

Finally, I wish to express, on behalf of my delegation, the fervent wish to see the Conference, as the central forum for disarmament negotiations, take bold initiatives founded on innovating ideas and concepts to pursue with wisdom and patience the consideration of the crucial questions of strategic security, arms control and disarmament in the world on the eve of the third millenium, where the concerns relating to ecology and sustainable development as well as the protection of the environment are at the heart of the debates in the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Algerian delegation as a whole. I now give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Ambassador Eksteen.

Mr. EKSTEEN (South Africa): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. As a fellow African, I am delighted to see you presiding over such an important meeting and wish to assure you of my delegation's full cooperation and assistance, and am also particularly glad that I can follow a fellow African in my speech. I should also like to congratulate your predecessors for their able leadership during the short period that South Africa has been attending this Conference. In addition, a special word of congratulations to Ambassador Berasategui on his assumption of the post of Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. His competency is well known. I wish to thank him and his staff for their assistance, advice and understanding. We look forward to a long and fruitful association.

Our presence here today is an historic occasion for South Africa. It is the first time that we address the Conference on Disarmament. We see this as being of particular relevance for the southern African region, and also for the African continent as a whole. We regard our presence here as yet another signal that South Africa stands ready to take its rightful place in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, when we commit ourselves to a role in Africa we want to do it in a positive and constructuve way so that all of Africa's interests can be served.

Foremost in the minds of everybody here is surely the finalization of a convention that will eliminate the scourge of chemical weapons. The South African Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed on 9 January 1989 at the conference on chemical weapons in Paris the South African Government's commitment to the principle of complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. On that occasion he declared:

> "We are very much aware of the devastating effects of chemical warfare and my country quite rightly acceded at an early date to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
>
> "Chemical technology and the art of warfare have both been transformed since the adoption of the Geneva Protocol. A truly international convention banning the use of chemical weapons is sorely needed.
>
> "South Africa stands ready to participate in any ... conference convened to elaborate such a convention."

That remains South Africa's commitment. You can rely on our fullest cooperation.

(Mr. Eksteen, South Africa)

In this regard I want to convey my delegation's appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the bureau and the secretariat for the effort they have put into producing CD working paper 400. It is a well-structured document that could form a strong basis for item-transcending compromises in order to meet our deadline of finalizing the convention this summer.

In addition to the threat of chemical weapons, the nuclear threat unfortunately still exists. South Africa acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty on 10 July 1991. Only two months later, on 16 September 1991, South Africa concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - also a fact that my distinguished friend and Ambassador from Senegal noted previously. The practical implementation of the agreement is in progress.

Not only do these actions illustrate South Africa's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but they underscore our desire to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free zone in southern Africa. Thus, the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa has invited nuclear scientists and experts in related fields from Africa to visit its facilities and eventually cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The first bilateral agreement following such a visit is almost finalized.

The quest for the complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war must be addressed soon and with conviction. With this in mind, it is of great concern that, with the obvious exception of the proposed chemical weapons convention, the Conference on Disarmament has not - at least during the time that South Africa has been an observer - achieved substantial progress on most of the other topics on its agenda. Targeted and real progress on well-focused issues of disarmament is in the best interest of all States, regardless of size and stature in the international community. The scope of progress always relates directly to the political will with which a problem is approached. The time has come, also here in Geneva, for some hard and creative rethinking on the approach to disarmament in the global as well as the regional context. An oportunity for the international community exists now. Let us grasp it with both hands.

For its part, South Africa is ready to accept its international obligations. Our presence here is proof that South Africa is taking practical steps to honour its international obligations. South Africa, being fully aware of its regional and global obligations, of which disarmament is but one, will play its rightful role as a responsible member of the international community. As a direct result of the initiatives of President De Klerk to pursue a peaceful, negotiated political settlement in South Africa, we have been part of the international trend in greatly reducing our military expenditure. That is a sign of my Government's desire for peace and good-neighbourliness in our region and in the global context. It is in this spirit that you will find South Africa to be a constructive partner in the crucial deliberations of this Conference - now and in the future. We want to demonstrate our willingness to be a responsible and active member of the international community. We pledge our support in the quest to achieve the objectives of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Mr. MANGACHI (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. President, I should like to sincerely congratulate you on your unanimous election to preside over this important Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that with your distinguished credentials and proven ability, you will lead the deliberations of this Conference to a successful conclusion.

Allow me to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my Government to all the members of the Disarmament Committee for their unanimous endorsement of my country's request to participate in the proceedings of this session of the Conference on Disarmament in an observer capacity.

My Government fully subscribes to the objective of achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In this vein the United Republic of Tanzania has been following the disarmament initiatives with very keen interest. Besides her particpation in the United Nations disarmament conferences, Tanzania has also played an active role in the six-nation initiative on nuclear disarmament which included Argentina, India, Mexico, Sweden and Greece. These nations issued the Delhi Declaration on 28 January 1985 appealing for an all-embracing halt to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. They also urged the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. A complete test ban would ensure that nuclear arsenals do not grow while negotiations proceed. The test ban must be immediately followed by substantial reductions leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. To further confirm our full commitment to the goal of non-nuclear weapons proliferation Tanzania acceded to the NPT on 26 May 1991.

My Government commends the CD for the progress made in the negotiations for an international convention on chemical weapons.

There is considerable experience of the conversion of military industry to civilian production since the disarmament process began. Hence scientific and technological innovation in the military sphere can be redirected towards social and economic development. In this regard it is expected that developed countries would agree to transfer these technologies to the developing countries on concessional and grant terms. My delegation further hopes that a substantial part of the resources to be released by the reduction in defence budgets in the developed countries would be used for the provision of additional resources to the developing countries so as to enable them to solve their environmental and development problems.

Finally, I should like to reiterate my Government's great faith and full confidence in the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

As I announced to you at the beginning of this meeting, I now intend to submit to the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD11/45). The recommendation provides that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will hold its next session from 27 July to 7 August. If there are no objections, may I take it that the Conference adopts the Ad Hoc Group's recommendation? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now invite the Conference to take note of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test (GSETT-2), distributed as CD11/44. May I consider the Conference takes note of the sixth report? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The secretariat has distributed today at my request an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable was compiled in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies; as usual it is purely indicative and where necessary can be changed. I would like to inform you that Thursday, 28 May is an official holiday for the United Nations Office at Geneva and that no technical services will be provided on that day. Therefore the timetable indicates no meeting for Thursday, 28 May. The plenary meeting is therefore scheduled in the timetable for Tuesday, 26 May. As you will note, an informal meeting on the substance of item 2 on the agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", is scheduled in the timetable for Tuesday, 26 May, immediately after the plenary meeting. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Conference is prepared to adopt the timetable. There are no objections.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria made a statement today which coincides with the end of Algeria's term as President. Allow me simply, to conclude this month as President, to pay tribute to delegations for their contribution to our work and in my task. I am also grateful to the members of the secretariat, the translators and the interpreters, for assisting me and performing their tasks effectively. I hope that the term of Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina, who will be occupying the post of President of the Conference for the rest of May and up to 21 June, will be crowned with success.

(The President)

In accordance with the timetable of meetings for this week, I would like to remind you that the informal open-ended consultations on the question of transparency in armaments planned for Friday, 22 May at 3 p.m. will be held today at 3 p.m. in the same room. Since the consultations which were to be held by Ambassador Zahran of Egypt on 22 May have been cancelled, in agreement with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, it has been decided that open-ended consultations will be held on the question of old or abandoned weapons on Friday, 22 May at 3 p.m., chaired by Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia, in Room V. The meeting of the Working Group on verification in the chemical industry, which is to be held this afternoon in Room V, has been postponed to 4.15 p.m. precisely instead of 3 p.m. I would like to emphasize that the Chairman of the Working Group will start the meeting at 4.15 sharp. I hope that all delegations have taken careful note of these changes in the timetable. As you have already been told, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on item 3 on the agenda which will start five minutes after the end of this plenary meeting.

Since our business for today is finished, I will now adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 May at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.622
26 May 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 May 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Roberto García Moritán (Argentina)

GE.92-61551/4549B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 622nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, and in so doing, I should like to place on record my very special thanks to the delegations of Yugoslavia and Zaire, to whom it fell to start up the 1992 session of our organ in a particularly special year for all of us, and in particular to the distinguished delegation of Algeria, which most efficiently carried out its tasks to the satisfaction of all the members of our Conference. It fell to Ambassador Semichi to represent the Conference on Disarmament on the occasion of the working visits to the cities of The Hague and Vienna, and on both occasions he was the standard-bearer of our forum. I must emphasize on this occasion the satisfaction I cannot conceal at serving as President of the Conference in the company of the new Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, to whom I am bound by long years of respect and professional admiration, both in his capacity as a distinguished member of the Argentine foreign service and as an international civil servant of recognized merit.

The act of taking up the presidency of this Conference on Disarmament arouses in me a very special emotion. I have been familiar with this body for some time, like many of us here. This has enabled me over the years to take part in negotiations - and more than once in non-negotiations - that have been taking place here in every frame of mind and within the context of diametrically opposed international circumstances. Like many of you I have witnessed and I have also used, in the performance of our common task as diplomats, the language of concord and sometimes the language of disagreement.

Taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament involves a great deal of routine. In fact, as some of my predecessors in this place have said on more than one occasion, ultimately it is the passage of time and alphabetical order that place us in the central chair on this podium. But we also know that there is something more behind the mechanical procedures and mere administrative routine. Behind these actions there are also some very special principles. One of these is that of universality of this forum. Another is that of the equal and shared responsibility that each of us exercises on behalf of his or her country in the negotiations on the legally binding instruments that are prepared and negotiated here. It is perhaps these principles that prompt me this morning to try to share with you a few brief thoughts that are intended to highlight trends from the particular viewpoint of the presidency of this Conference on Disarmament.

The first matter of importance to note is that which indicates to us that, after many years, this body is engaged in the finalization of an agreement on security and disarmament. The convention on chemical weapons is an instrument that will mark a watershed for many reasons. First of all, and I think this is obvious, owing to its intrinsic importance, because it will ban a whole category of weapons of mass destruction which were used in armed conflicts a very short time ago, and whose continued presence would be a latent threat. Secondly, the convention on chemical weapons will constitute an interesting example of diplomatic negotiations that are almost unique of their kind, given the interaction between defence, politics, science, industry

(The President)

and trade that the convention brings together in a manner that I would venture to describe as unprecedented in the history of multilateral negotiations. To serve as President in one of the final months of negotiation on this convention is a privilege in itself and bears out the capability of multilateral forums to address issues of immense complexity and find proper responses to interests and perceptions that are as divergent and as numerous as there are delegations around this table. I think that is in itself a positive element which should give political decision makers food for thought at the moment when they are to decide whether to open up to multilateral consideration through the Conference on Disarmament the many issues that are still pending on the overall security agenda. The chemical convention will be an excellent example of what can be achieved.

Another line of thought that I should like to mention this morning relates to the membership of this organ. If we raise our eyes and look around us, we will be able to note the paradox that the number of observer delegations meeting this morning in this Council chamber exceeds that of the full members of the Conference. Many of those delegations are observers only in name, since their contributions to the negotiations are well known and I think most appreciated by all. I do not think it would be incorrect to say that the chemical convention includes a great many contributions from delegations that in theory are observers. This should help us to shake off the weight of decades that the Conference has allowed itself to accumulate concerning its enlargement. Our presence in this small group of permanent members should not cause us to forget that around us there are many delegations that have much to contribute and justifiably claim the right to do so as full members of this Conference. The question of the enlargement and the membership of the CD cannot wait. The quest for a wide variety of imaginative, democratic and practical solutions to this problem must begin now so as to arrive at a positive decision in 1993.

Another practical fact that I should like to mention this morning is the state and content of our agenda. I will not seek here and now to enter into ad hoc considerations about merits or defects, or even the topicality or obsolete nature of the items on our agenda, including the "decalogue" of subjects that were identified - this is worth remembering - more than 15 years ago. The point of my mentioning this is simply to ask myself in your presence which are the items that increasingly feature in delegations' statements. Simple statistical observation based on a reading of the verbatim records will show - above and beyond the value of judgement we are required to make on each issue - that items such as transparency in armaments, the regional dimension of disarmament, confidence-building measures and non-proliferation in a broad and non-discriminatory sense are the items which are now perceived as real and pressing ones that offer a common denominator of concern to our capitals. This would seem to indicate that they should feature on the new operational agenda of disarmament sooner or later if this multilateral forum is to avoid becoming irrelevant. Perhaps the process may not be easy. Old habits are always hard to root out. But the effort has to be made. In our case, an impracticable agenda is the best guarantee of inaction. A great politician of our century, Jawaharlal Nehru, once said something that I think should be borne in mind when we are thinking about these matters: "A moment comes which

(The President)

comes but very rarely in history when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends". To my mind, the finalization of the convention on chemical weapons marks one such moment for the Conference on Disarmament when change is not a frivolity but the act of imposing reality. This process will mark the end of one Conference on Disarmament and at the same time signal the beginning of another, one in tune with its times, the accurate reflection of the real security dilemmas at the end of this century. In any event, I hope that when, with the passage of time and the alphabet, a new representative of Argentina occupies this Chair, he or she will be presiding over a vigorous and active body, one that has been able to read the signs of the times instead of being overtaken by them. For the rest, I intend to give this term as President the tone of discretion and effectiveness that the times demand.

Allow me now, in accordance with the timetable of meetings for this week, to remind you that at the end of this plenary meeting today, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substantive issues under item 2 of the agenda of the Conference, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

On the list of speakers for today are the distinguished representatives of the Philippines, Egypt (who will take the floor in his capacity as Special Coordinator on transparency in armaments) and the distinguished representative of France. I now call on the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of the Philippines, Ambassador Villarroel.

Mr. VILLARROEL (Philippines): On behalf of the Philippine delegation, I would like to express the appreciation of the Philippine Government to the members of the Conference for admitting the Philippines as observer to the Conference. The Philippine Government attaches great importance to the work of the Conference and I would like to assure you of our full cooperation in pursuing the objectives of the Conference. For we believe that the Conference plays a crucial and positive role in strengthening international peace, security and stability.

Perhaps at no time in its existence has the Conference been provided, as it is today, with the propitious opportunity to rid the world of the arms threat. The recent dramatic changes in international relations augur well for far-reaching initiatives in arms control and disarmament. Today we see genuine enthusiasm among States to explore new avenues not only in arresting the arms race but also in preventing the actual use of these instruments of mass destruction.

We believe that the pursuit of peace and security is a global concern and not merely the responsibility of one or a few States. We join other States in calling for comprehensive and realistic approaches for further reducing armaments, leading to general and complete disarmament. This stand is consistent with the Philippine support for all United Nations disarmament and arms control resolutions. And, with the other ASEAN member countries which also participate in this Conference, we share a vision of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in our region.

(Mr. Villarroel, Philippines)

On nuclear weapons, the Philippines, consistent with its national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. Thus we want to see effective international arrangements and agreements to protect non-nuclear States like the Philippines, against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

We also welcome the great strides made in this Conference in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological and other new weapons. The Conference indeed plays a constructive role in providing a forum for the negotiation of comprehensive international agreements for the elimination of these weapons of mass destruction.

On the use of outer space, our last frontier, we reiterate our long-held position that the militarization of outer space is unacceptable. We support international efforts in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space be made for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind.

Finally, we hope to see the vast resources spent on the development, production and stockpiling of armaments diverted for peaceful and development purposes. It is indeed ironic to witness unbridled military expenditure in a world in which millions of human beings live in abject poverty, ignorance and disease. The 1992 Human Development Report shows that a 3 per cent reduction of military expenditure by all countries would realize a peace dividend of about 1.5 trillion United States dollars. Although money cannot buy peace, we firmly believe none the less, that money wisely spent can help bring about lasting peace.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Philippines for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran, in his capacity as Special Coordinator on transparency in armaments.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt): Mr. President, it is a personal source of pleasure to see you, the distinguished representative of Argentina and son of the great continent of Latin America, preside over our work during this important period of this current session of the Conference on Disarmament. Your competence, wisdom and diplomatic skills are well known to everyone. We are confident that during your presidency the Conference will mark progress in its deliberations regarding its agenda. I also wish, at this juncture, to pay tribute to the excellent efforts made by Ambassador Abdelhamid Semichi of Algeria, whose experience and excellent personal abilities helped steer our work, successfully, during his presidency of the Conference.

I wish to report to the Conference in connection with the mandate given to me at the 617th plenary meeting on 19 March 1992. Since then, in my capacity as Special Coordinator for the question of transparency in armaments, I have conducted intensive consultations with the various groups and China, as well as with individual delegations. These consultations have led to a very

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

useful exchange of views, in which many delegations have participated. I wish at this stage to thank all members for their cooperation and invaluable assistance to me during our consultations on this important subject.

As a result of these efforts, I am submitting today for consideration of the Conference working paper CD/WP.427, containing a draft decision on organizational arrangements in connection with General Assembly resolution 46/36 L. As you can see, the working paper is brief and may not need detailed explanations, so I will not elaborate on its contents. It simply decides to add to our agenda for this annual session an item entitled "Transparency in armaments", under which we can address the issues raised in the said resolution, bearing in mind the time frame contained therein. We would therefore include a section covering our work on this agenda item in the 1992 report to the General Assembly. The preparation of the draft report will be done as for other items on the agenda of the Conference. The last paragraph refers to certain actions to be taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. First, as indicated in paragraph 11 (b) of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, to take into account the work of the Conference in his preparation of a report to the General Assembly in 1994 on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register and its further development. Further, the Conference is invited to take note of the request made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in paragraph 14 of the said resolution to provide to the Conference all relevant information. In this connection, I have already approached the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, who has informed me that the secretariat will comply with that request by making such information available to the members of the Conference progressively and in due course.

The draft decision proposes to address the agenda item in a series of informal meetings of the CD. Of course, nothing prevents the Conference, if it so agrees, from considering further the question of the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with the agenda item at a later stage, for example, early next year, when the Conference examines organizational arrangements for all the agenda items in the light of the resolutions relating to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which may be adopted by the fourty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

During the informal consultations, I proposed some guidelines, under my own responsibility, for the conduct of informal meetings in order to address the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. I think that they will be useful in organizing our work on the new agenda item if the Conference so decides and may be duly reflected in the 1992 annual report of the Conference to the fourty-seventh General Assembly session.

The formulation that is proposed in the draft decision for the new agenda item is so general that it will allow discussion of any matter relevant to the question of transparency in armaments. As you well know, it has always been the practice of the Conference, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, to facilitate the widest possible exchange of views on any agenda item. Thus, the text proposed, as well as our own practice, ensure that

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

in this case also, every member will have an opportunity of expressing views on any aspect which would be considered appropriate for the subject-matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, as you take up the presidency of our Conference, allow me to address my warmest congratulations to you. Allow me also to tell you how happy I am personally to see in the Chair the representative of a great country which is close to mine in many ways, a country that is offering concrete proof of its commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, thus demonstrating its sense of responsibility at a crucial moment. Allow me also to express my satisfaction at seeing in the Chair a great diplomat whose competence and experience will be of great value to us during our work. Lastly, I would like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Semichi, for the talent, the remarkable authority, with which he carried out his important functions, and, as you said, the quite exemplary fashion, which everyone had an opportunity to admire, in which he represented us with dignity, both at the seminar in The Hague and on our visit to Vienna.

On 8 April, the French Prime Minister announced that, on the instructions of the President of the Republic, France was suspending nuclear testing for 1992. This decision reflects the three main features of the policy pursued by France in the sphere of international security: its constant attitude of restraint, its determination to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and its resolve to contribute to nuclear disarmament.

In order to meet its legitimate security needs, to preserve its independence and vital interests, France has opted for a strategy of deterrence, which remains the keystone of its defence policy. France made this choice in specific geopolitical circumstances and in a context of East-West relations which is well known. It will remain our choice for as long as the conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons have not been met. Hence deterrence remains an imperative for us, with all its strategic and technological constraints. It remains at the heart of our defence system. Our doctrine, which is purely defensive, has always been based on the possession of autonomous nuclear forces maintained at a strict level of sufficiency, taking into account the imperatives of the international environment. We have always been guided by the principle of restraint, and this restraint has taken the form of deeds. First, our constant concern for a strict limit on the number and yield of our tests, which have been intended to maintain our defensive systems at the threshold of credibility and to meet their security and safety needs. Next, our de facto compliance, from 1975 onwards, with the provisions of the Moscow partial test-ban treaty, as well as the yield thresholds laid down in the 1974 and 1976 American-Soviet treaties. And last, a progressive reduction in the number of our tests, which fell to six per year, along with a redefinition of our programmes. As is well known, this attitude of restraint adopted by France has been accompanied by a policy

(Mr. Errera, France)

of transparency vis à vis the international community. Independent international missions were able to come and verify on the spot that our experiments presented no danger either for the populations involved or for the environment. The most recent was carried out by an IAEA laboratory, to conduct comparative measurements of radioactivity. Finally, it is public knowledge that for some years France has been notifying the international community of the tests it has carried out, providing indications of yields.

The choice France made went hand in hand with its determination to participate in the general effort to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which has become one of the major priorities of the international community, as we were reminded by the United Nations Security Council on 31 January. On 3 June 1991, France introduced an arms control and disarmament plan. This plan included, among other things, a decision to accede to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Moreover, my country decided to make the application of comprehensive safeguards a condition for its nuclear exports. It is taking an active part in the consultations initiated by the five main arms-exporting Powers to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction and apply rules of restraint to transfers of conventional weapons. It seeks the strengthening of the verification capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and has formulated specific proposals to that end together with its partners. Finally, it gave a practical demonstration of its support for regional non-proliferation efforts by deciding to ratify Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The signal that France is sending today is of course addressed to the nuclear Powers. France wishes to demonstrate that it does not seek to shirk its responsibilities in any way, and considers that it would be useful to hold an in-depth debate on the new prospects for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and also on the contributions that the nuclear Powers can make in this area. We are at a turning-point in non-proliferation policy, and the initiative taken by France is intended to highlight that fact. Everyone is aware of the path that is being taken unequivocally: the beginning of real nuclear disarmament. In this respect we welcome the signing of the Protocol to the START Treaty between the United States, Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on 23 May in Lisbon.

Everyone knows too, however, that this progress along the road to nuclear disarmament would be seriously jeopardized if elsewhere in the world, overtly or covertly, some countries ventured to develop programmes to acquire nuclear weapons, or more generally weapons of mass destruction. In this context, we consider that France's gesture responds to the expectations of the overwhelming majority of the international community, and particularly the developing countries, which, having made a clear choice in favour of non-proliferation, hope at the same time to strengthen their security, by

(Mr. Errera, France)

Let there be no misunderstanding: those who would act contrary to these aspirations would endanger the stability but also the economic progress of the developing countries. We have taken note with satisfaction of the decision of additional countries to accede to the NPT, whose credibility has thus been strengthened in the run-up to the 1995 extension conference. We consider that this date is a major landmark which should make it possible to ensure the full universality of the Treaty and enhance its effectiveness.

France's recent decision does not only illustrate its policy of restraint or its policy of non-proliferation, but also testifies to its practical commitment in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. With the end of the East-West confrontation, not only has the nuclear arms race between the two super-Powers been halted, but prospects have opened up for an effective and substantial reduction in their degree of over-armament. France hopes that these Powers will now be able to go beyond the Lisbon agreement in consolidating the efforts they have begun to reduce their arsenals yet further. The commitments made bilaterally or unilaterally to reduce the current level of over-armament should be rapidly put into effect. No new destabilizing development should oppose this trend. Thus, the efforts of the United States and Russia should normally lead those countries to position themselves at considerably lower levels in the shortest possible time. France has already expressed not only its support for this process but also its willingness to join negotiations in this area at the appropriate time. In the interim, it initiated a review of ways of bringing its defensive systems into line with the new prospects. It has also adopted unilateral measures, deciding not to deploy its new Hades ground-to-ground missile and to dismantle the Pluton missiles and the ASX airborne weapons ahead of schedule.

It is on the basis of this general analysis that France has decided to take part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on a Nuclear Test Ban when it is re-established. We will participate in an open-minded manner without preconceptions, in order to identify jointly the prospects but also any conditions and obstacles there may be in this area. The Committee's mandate adopted in 1980 and 1991, and basically renewed this year, should allow an in-depth examination of the specific issues relating to a nuclear test ban, whether with regard to structure, scope, verification or compliance. However -- and this is no secret -- the negotiation of a test ban treaty remains in our view inseparable from progress in nuclear disarmament in the framework of general and complete disarmament. As far as verification is concerned, my delegation attaches great importance to the continuation of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in seismology, in which it has already participated in the context of data exchange trials, and in which it will play a full part. In short, our decision, as everyone will understand, is a gesture of goodwill intended to encourage what we see as a positive trend, and one we think it our duty to reinforce, in the area of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malta, Mr. Valentino.

Mr. VALENTINO (Malta): Mr. President, allow me to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference, and to assure you of my delegation's full cooperation and support. I should also like to convey our appreciation for the excellent manner in which your distinguished predecessor, His Excellency Abdelhamid Semichi of Algeria, directed our work during the important phase of this Conference. My delegation also wishes to congratulate Ambassador Vicente Berasategui on his assumption of the important office of Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Conference on Disarmament and Secretary-General of this Conference.

From statements heard by delegations during the first and second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, there is complete unanimity about the need to conclude a chemical weapons convention in the shortest possible time-frame. Malta welcomes the contribution by the Government of Australia in presenting the draft text for the chemical weapons convention, which is seen as a very valuable input in the ongoing negotiating process. The Australian initiative has certainly facilitated delegations in their work and efforts in speeding up the process for the early conclusion of the convention this year. Malta would like to see such efforts being further pursued by all delegations, especially those which are deeply involved in the present negotiations. Serious efforts on the part of the negotiators and an enhanced spirit of compromise should be given top priority during all discussions on the pending issues on the draft chemical weapons convention. We cannot proceed further unless such efforts are pursued in such a direction.

Despite the initiatives that have been taken by various delegations and policy statements of support by members of the Conference and distinguished personalities, we note that there are still important issues to be resolved, and this indicates on the part of certain delegations a lack of confidence in the discussions and negotiations on this important international security treaty.

Malta, which is unequivocally committed to the achievement of a total ban on chemical weapons, possesses no such weapons, nor has the means of producing them, nor the intention of acquiring them. Malta's stand in international forums has always been that of the total banning of all kinds of chemical weapons. We stress our complete opposition to all forms of chemical weapons, their manufacture, their stockpiling and their use. We reject without any reservation the justification that this is the poor nations' answer to nuclear weapons. Malta joined the Conference on Disarmament as a non-member in August 1991 due to the important negotiations on the chemical weapons

(Mr. Valentino, Malta)

security of States - but at the same time its objective is to improve both international security and the security of each State party. Another important factor is that regarding the security aspect of the Mediterranean region, to which Malta attaches great importance.

Universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention is imperative, and Malta will be among the original signatories to the chemical weapons convention. Malta as a defenceless country looks to those countries which are involved in intensive consultations on a chemical weapons convention to spare no efforts to iron out the final difficulties, particularly those linked to the verification and destruction of chemical weapons. In conclusion, my delegation would like to support all the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee as well as those of the chairmen of the working groups and the friends of the Chair on the various issues being negotiated and that such efforts be aimed primarily at concluding the chemical weapons convention well in time this year in the interests of all developed and developing countries.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Malta for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. This morning the members of the Conference have heard the presentation by the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran, of document CD/WP.427, which contains a draft decision on organizational arrangements in connection with transparency in armaments. I understand that the Conference is ready to take up the draft decision. That being so, may I ask whether there is any objection to the text which appears in document CD/WP.427? The distinguished delegation of Mexico has the floor - Ambassador Maria Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): We are most pleased to see you presiding over our work, Sir, and we congratulate you. We are linked by many years of friendship, during which we have striven together for a more just and peaceful world in this and other multilateral disarmament forums. Now the times have changed, but our personal friendship has not changed. We wish you success in every field here and beyond this Council Chamber. We are sincerely grateful for the responsible and effective contribution of Ambassador Semichi and the other members of the Algerian delegation to the work of this Conference.

We listened very closely to what was said by Ambassador Zahran of Egypt a few moments ago in introducing the draft decision on organizational arrangements in connection with General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, as it appears in CD/WP.427. We congratulate Ambassador Zahran for the agreement he has secured on this major issue. However, we still have to clear up just how the agreement will be reflected in the document which contains our agenda. For the Mexican delegation it is obvious that the title of the new item should be followed by an asterisk indicating that the item was included in accordance with the decision that we shall adopt today. We would be pleased to know whether the President and the Secretary-General share our view of this matter.

(The President)

particular, I am persuaded that Ambassador Zahran as Special Coordinator on transparency in armaments will take what has been said duly into consideration. Does any other delegation wish to make any statement on the document under consideration (CD/WP.427)? There are no objections?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have adopted document CD/WP.427 and the draft decision contained in it. The distinguished delegation of Cuba has asked for the floor.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we are pleased to see you guide our work and we congratulate you on your appointment. We also wish to express gratitude to the delegation of Algeria for the excellent performance of its duties in the office of President of the Conference during the past month.

We have adopted a decision on the inclusion in the 1992 agenda of the Conference on Disarmament of the item "Transparency in armaments". From the beginning of the consultations on this matter the delegation of Cuba and others, most recently through the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, made suggestions aimed at preventing the discriminatory approach which characterizes General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, leaving the production storage, and transfer of advanced weapons technology - the root of this problem - free of international scrutiny, from being the keynote of the work of the Conference on Disarmament on this issue. We listened closely to the statement made by His Excellency Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, and it is on the understanding set out in that statement and the clarifications he gave that we associate ourselves with the decision taken today. We particularly note the reference he made to the fact that matters interrelated with this item, as well as rule 30 of the rules of procedure of the CD, will guide the debate on transparency in armaments. The delegation of Cuba will take part in the work on this item that we have now included in our agenda for this year with these clarifications very much in mind. It only remains for me to express the hope of my delegation that the drive with which agreement has been reached today will extend to those items that are already on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and most particularly the nuclear items, in which the deadlock, in the view of my delegation, has nothing to do with, and is not attributable to, the importance of those items, but to a continuing lack of political will for progress.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): As I am taking the floor in the plenary for the first time, allow me to extend to you, Mr. President, my sincere congratulations on taking up the Chair of the Conference. I would like to take this opportunity to stress that the relations between China and Argentina are very friendly and cooperative. We appreciate the important role played by Argentina in international affairs. Your outstanding diplomatic skills and rich experience are known to everyone. We are convinced that under

(Mr. Hou, China)

for his efforts and contributions during his tenure. I would also like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan and Ambassador Weston of the United Kingdom. We look forward to close cooperation with them.

The Chinese delegation did not express any dissenting views on document CD/WP.427. We did not raise any objection to the decision adopted just now. At the same time I would like to state that at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly the Chinese delegation did not take part in the vote on resolution 46/36 L. Furthermore, we have taken note of the statement made by the distinguished representative of Egypt as coordinator on this subject.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my country and to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, in connection with the decision we have just adopted, I should like, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to convey to Ambassador Zahran our special thanks for the diplomatic skill and effectiveness with which he conducted the informal consultations on such an important issue as transparency in armaments. His contribution has certainly been decisive in finding formulas acceptable to the Conference. As indicated in paragraph 2 of the decision we have just adopted, the new agenda item will be considered in a series of informal meetings under the chairmanship of Ambassador Zahran. The Special Coordinator will now organize the informal meetings in question; I think he knows that he can rely for that purpose on all my support and cooperation.

I have no further speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? The distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran, has the floor.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): After the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of the decision referred to in document CD/WP.427 I would like to express to you Mr. President, and all the members my sincere gratitude and appreciation for the trust that you have placed in me to carry out this task in accordance with the decision adopted by the Conference. This is an honour not only for me but also for my country, which I am representing here. I shall make every possible effort to prove myself worthy of the trust that you have placed in me.

In collaboration with Ambassador Berasategui, the Secretary-General of this Conference, the group coordinators and China, I shall be organizing the informal meetings that you have requested me to convene, Mr. President, in order to complete the task that you have entrusted to me so that we can then prepare the draft report to be submitted to the Conference in due course.

I would like to take this opportunity to convey the congratulations and

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Thank you very much, Ambassador Zahran, for your words. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I shall turn to another matter. Today, the secretariat has circulated a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been drawn up following consultations with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As is customary, the timetable is indicative and may be amended as necessary. It is possible that this will indeed prove necessary, as our work progresses in the course of this week - for example following the decision just adopted by the Conference on the holding of informal meetings on transparency in armaments. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As I announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substantive issues under item 2 of the agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". This meeting will begin five minutes after the adjournment of plenary. Before closing, I call on the distinguished delegation of Peru, which has asked for the floor. It is my pleasure to give the floor to Mr. Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you my warm congratulations, those of my country and my own personally, on presiding over our work, and as of now I wish you every success, which of course I take for granted bearing in mind your proverbial capabilities. I also wish to convey thanks to Ambassador Semichi of Algeria for the noteworthy work he has accomplished over the past four weeks.

I have no observations to make about the programme you are putting before the Conference this morning. I should simply like to place on record my surprise to see that so far no meeting has been scheduled for the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances. The mandate was one of the first adopted in February of this year, and my delegation naturally cannot help being surprised that up to now matters have been left in a state of limbo. I hope that there will soon be a meeting convened on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Peru for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no other matters to discuss, and unless any delegation wishes to take up something in particular, I shall adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 4 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.